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Title VI and the Constitution: A Regulatory 
Model for Defining "Discrimination" 
CHARLES F. ABERNATHY* 
In recent years confusion has surrounded the proper interpretation of 
title VI of the Civr1 Rights Act of 1964., which prohibits discrimination in 
programs receiving federal financial assistance. Some courts have held 
that the title prohibits only intentional discrimination. Others have held 
that it proscribes actions having discriminatory tffects as well, an inter-
pretation that imposes a great burden on federal grantees. The 
Supreme Court heightened the confusion when jive individual justices in 
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke questioned the pro-
priety of the Court's earlier adoption of an "tff"ects, test for title VL 
Professor Abernathy argues that this confusion results from a misdi-
rected inquiry on the part of the courts. After a comprehensive review of 
pertinent legislative history, Professor Abernathy concludes that Con-
gress did not intend title VI to require either an "intenr or an "if.fects,, 
test. Instead, Congress accepted a compromise position, delegating the 
definition of discrimination to the administrative agency responsible for 
implementating each ajfected program. As a result of his analysis, Pro-
fessor Abernathy suggests standards under which agencies should adopt 
regulatory decisions. 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 bans discrimination based on race, 
color, or national origin in any program or activity receiving federal financial 
assistance. Although Congress passed title VI during a period of intense con-
cern with public school desegregation, the statute encompasses not only educa-
tion but also every other area of federal concern, from agriculture to 
transportation.2 Title VI also has served as a model for recent legislation ban-
ning other forms of discrimination, including that based on sex, 3 mental and 
physical handicap,4 and age.5 Moreover, because a great number of privately 
controlled organizations, as well as state and local governments, now receive 
• Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B. 1969, J.D. 1973, Harvard 
University. The author expresses appreciation to those colleagues who co=ented on his ideas, and 
particularly to Roy Schotland who criticized Part III of this article. 
I. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). 
2. Most federal cabinet-level departments have promulgated regulations under title VI to govern the 
funding programs that each administers. See 7 C.F.R. §§ 15.1-.143 (1981) (Agriculture); 15 C.F.R. 
§§ 8.1-.15 (1981) (Co=erce); 22 C.F.R. §§ 141.1-.12 (1980) (State); 24 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-.12 (1981) (Hous-
ing and Urban Development); 28 C.F.R. §§ 42.1-.540 (1980) (Justice); 29 C.F.R. §§ 31.1-.12 (1980) 
(Labor); 32 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.14 (1980) (Defense); 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.1-.13 (1981) (Education); 43 C.F.R. 
§§ 17.1-.12 (1980) (Interior); 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.1-.13 (1980) (Health and Human Services); 49 C.F.R. 
§§ 21.1-.23 (1980) (Transportation). The Department of the Treasury apparently has failed to adopt 
such regulations. 
3. See Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) (repeating language of title VI to 
ban sex discrimination in certain educational programs). 
4. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979) (repeating language of title VI to 
ban discrimination against handicapped in programs receiving federal funds). 
5. See Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 6102 (1976) (repeating language of title VI to 
ban age discrimination in programs receiving federal funds). 
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federal funds that subject them to the command oftitle Vl,6 the statute and its 
analogues have become important modem adjuncts to the equal protection 
principles of the Constitution.7 
Yet, precisely what does title VI add to the equal protection guaranteed by 
the Constitution? In covering private parties, the statute reaches beyond the 
probable limit of the state action doctrine of the fourteenth amendment, 8 and 
that is certainly an important contribution. But does the title VI prohibition of 
"discrimination" also extend the substantive content of the constitutional 
equal protection principle? That has been the focus of a long-running dispute. 
The Supreme Court h.eld in Lau v. Nicho!s9 that title VI, supplementea by 
agency regulations, prohibits action having a discriminatory effect even though 
the Constitution prohibits only intentional discrimination. 10 A majority of the 
Court in Regents of the University of Ca!!forina v. Bakke, 11 however, cast doubt 
on the holding of Lau by suggesting that the standards applicable under title 
VI might be coterminous with those of the equal protection clause. 12 The fed-
eral courts of appeals have likewise followed divergent paths. 13 
This dispute has obvious public policy implications. The Lau "effects test" 
for discrimination would so effectively supplement constitutional claims by 
plaintiffs, because of the pervasiveness of federal funding of state and local 
government, that the Court's adoption of an intent test for unconstitutional 
discrimination 14 would be substantially superseded, if not practically reversed. 
If the effects test were to prevail, recipients of federal funds would necessarily 
6. Compiling a complete list of federal aid programs to private entities and state and local govern-
ments is as elusive today as it was in 1963-64, when Congress debated and passed title VI. See note 51 
infra (discussing inability of 88th Congress to establish with certainty number of programs or dollar 
value of grants to be covered by title VI). A sense of the pervasiveness of such federal aid is apparent, 
however, from the aggregate figures in the federal budget. The actual figures for 1980, the latest avail-
able for a completed fiscal year, show grants-in-aid totaling over $91 billion, or 15.8% of total budget 
outlays. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL 
ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 1982 at 252 (Table H-7). 
That figure, although it includes over $34 billion in grants to states and localities for payments to 
individuals, excludes direct federal grants to private entities. I d. Every cabinet-level department except 
Energy and Justice exceeded one billion dollars in such outlays in 1980, and Health and Human Serv-
ices ($28.6 billion) and Transportation ($13 billion) each exceeded $10 billion in grants to state and 
local governments. I d. at 250 (Table H-5). By region, the outlay in such grants ranged from $328 to 
$502 per capita in 1980. I d. at 251 (Table H-6). Afthough such expenditures may now be decreasing in 
their rate of growth, id. at 239, for the period from 1958 to 1978 such grants grew at an average annual 
rate of 14.6%. Id. 
7. See U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 2 (equal protection binding on state governments); id. amend. V 
(due process binding on federal government). Although the fifth amendment does not contain an equal 
protection clause, the Supreme Court has held that the fourteenth amendment equal protection require-
ments are implicit in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 
93 (1976) (per curiam) (equal protection analysis under fifth amendment same as that under fourteenth 
amendment); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (invalidating racial segregation in public 
schools of District of Columbia as violative of due process guaranteed by fifth amendment). 
8. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 983-84 (lOth ed. 1980) (discussing inability of foUr· 
teenth amendment to reach discrimination not resulting from state action). 
9. 414 u.s. 563 (1974). 
10. Id. at 567-69. 
11. 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
12. See id. at 287 (opinion of Powell, J.) (title VI proscribes only actions that would violate equal 
protection clause or fifth amendment); id. at 325, 351-52 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & 
Blackmun, JJ.) (title VI meaning of discrimination absolutely coextensive with constitutional meaning). 
13. See note 138 infra (citing contradictory title VI cases from Second, Third, and Fifth Circuits). 
14. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-68 (1977) 
(showing of discriminatory purpose necessary to prove violation of equal protection clause; dispropor-
tionate impact alone insufficient). 
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become more attentive to the discriminatory effects of their actions, which in 
tum probably would place renewed emphasis on affirmative action to end dis-
criminatory results. 
There are also substantial institutional considerations affecting the alloca-
tion of responsibility between the executive and judicial branches of govern-
ment. If title VI standards are coterminous with those of the Constitution, the 
Supreme Court ultimately will set the standards when it interprets the Consti-
tution. Iftitle VI standards are independent of the Constitution, however, then 
other federal decisionmakers may set the definitional standards. Under the 
latter scheme, the Court's interpretation of the Constitution becomes a safety 
net below which title VI may not fall, but above which it may soar. The Con-
stitution-based scheme, on the other hand, would produce more mixed results, 
for although it might relieve some of the current angst over intrusive federal 
regulation, 15 it would not placate those who lodge similar complaints against 
the federal judiciary.I6 
This article seeks to resolve the dispute by re-examining the legislative 
events of 1963 and 1964 that led to the passage oftitle VI. An examination of 
the legislative history will demonstrate that Congress neither intended to 
mimic the Constitution's equal protection clause nor to create a new rigid stan-
dard. Rather, it adopted, as part of a complicated compromise, a regulatory 
model for title VI that invested federal departments and agencies with the 
power to define the discrimination forbidden by title VI. This means that both 
of the traditionally competing views of title VI are incorrect;17 Congress 
adopted neither an effects nor an intent test for discrimination, but instead 
authorized agencies to make the choice through regulations. 
To recognize that Congress adopted a regulatory model for title VI, how-
ever, solves only half the problem. The remaining question is how courts 
should respond to agency interpretation of title VI. The flexible answers of-
fered by administrative law principles fail to provide their usual enlightenment 
because Congress placed in title VI ~~~~ stringent limits on agencies' interpre-
tive powers. Moreover, one of these · "tations, the requirement that the Pres-
ident approve all agency regulations, has proved so cumbersome that it has 
spawned an entirely new set of regulatory problems as agencies adopt unoffi-
cial "guidelines" which they consider binding even without presidential ap-
proval. This article seeks to articulate the considerations that should govern 
judicial response to administrative interpretations of the title VI antidis-
crimination mandate. 
Finally, suggesting a judicial role for reviewing agency decisions under title 
VI requires that this article examine more closely than courts have done in the 
past what is meant by "effects" discrimination and "inten.tional" discrimina-
15. See SLOAN COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT AND HIGHER EDUCATION, REPORT: A PROGRAM 
FOR RENEWED PARTNERSHIP l-2, 5, 9-11 {1980) {criticizing "clumsy, duplicative, insensitive, time-con-
suming, ineffective and expensive" regulatory procedures, particularly those relating to 
antidiscrimination). 
16. See L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE 17 (1976) (criticizing Court's regulation of schools 
through desegregation decrees); cf. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 SuP. CT. REV. 329, 387-88 
(criticizing Court's "constitutional" regulation of family-state relations). 
17. See generally Benjes, Heubert & O'Brien, Legalil)' of Minimum Competency Testing Programs 
Under 1i~k YI of the Civr1 Rights Act of 1964, 15 HARV. C.Il-C.L. L. REV. 537, 542-43 (1980) (discuss-
ing challenges to competency tests based on both "effects" and "intent" theories of discrimination 
under title VI). 
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tion. These phrases mask a wide range of subtler issues, issues so controversial 
that one occasionally suspects that the phrases prove attractive to courts and 
agencies because they obscure statutory lines of authority. If courts are to give 
proper weight to agency regulations and guidelines, however, they must know 
which definition of discrimination an agency has chosen, and that topic is 
therefore a necessary part of the conclusion. 
I. AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF TITLE VI: CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY PRINCIPLES 
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND EARLY IMPACT 
I. Conceptual Origins: The Constitution or Wider Principle? 
When Congress in 1964 declared that recipients of federal funds may not 
discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin, it did not so much 
initiate one social and philosophical revolution as it enshrined two. Contrary 
to popular assumptions, 18 the drive for racial equality in the United States had 
not lain dormant during the first half of the twentieth century. 19 Rather, it had 
proceeded along two parallel lines, one in the courts and the other in Congress, 
leading ultimately to enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. On one front, 
reformers in the legislative and executive branches argued that as a matter of 
social policy the federal government ought to use all of its article I powers to 
reach and eradicate private racial discrimination.20 At the same time, reform-
18. An official government publication designed to promote understanding of discrimination in edu-
cation, for example, begins its discussion of the issue with the 1954 decision of Brown v. Board of 
Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and makes no mention of earlier civil rights efforts. NAT'L INST. OF 
EDUC., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, A CiTIZEN'S GUIDE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 
LAW 1 (1978). See also 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES Constitutional 
Law: CiVIl Rights 315 (1968) (failing to discuss civil rights activities that occurred between 1896 and 
1938, when separate-but-equal doctrine first questioned). One of the first widely disseminated docu-
ments revealing the long and continuous nature of the civil rights movement did not appear untill968. 
REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 100-13 (1968) (discussing origins and 
history of black protest movements from 1883 to 1967). Black civil rights groups won significant consti-
tutional victories in the first half of the twentieth century, but they relied on principles other than the 
equal protection clause to do so. See Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 259-61 (1937) (black agitator's 
conviction violated first amendment rights when evidence failed to demonstrate incitement to violence); 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (black defendant's conviction without effective counsel vio-
lated due process in capital case when defendant incapable of making own defense). Law was not the 
only discipline to ignore black dissatisfaction. Historians and the predominant schools of thought 
through the early 1950's downplayed slavery as an institution and looked benignly upon the experience 
of blacks in America. Davis, Slavery and the Post- World War II Historians, DAEDALUS, Spring 1974, at 
1; see Banton, 1960: A Turning Point in the Study of Race Relations, DAEDALUS, Spring 1974, at 31 
(explaining that sociologists perceived race relations as field with low status and slow theoretical devel· 
opment until 1960's); cf. K. STAMPP, THE ERA OF RECONSTRUCTION: 1865-1877, at 3-23 {1965) (dis-
cussing myths about Reconstruction). 
19. See general(y R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JusTICE 1-314 (1976) (discussing history of civil rights enforce-
ment before 1950); C. VosE, CAUCASIANS ONLY (1959) (providing specific study of role of NAACP in 
litigation challenging racially restrictive covenants). 
Legislative efforts produced only negative "suceesses." Civil rights advocates stopped some segrega-
tionist legislation early in the century, 6ut were unable to push thiough any of their own programs until 
the late 1950's. See REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 101 {1968) (dis-
cussing NAACP court victories and absence of new civil rights legislation in early 1900's); Douglas, 
Introduction to J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN at ix-xiii {1961) {Senator Paul H. Douglas 
noting Senate's inability to pass legislation mandating desegregation in the 1950's). 
20. See PRESIDENTS COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS 107-12, 151-73 
(1947) (recommending federal protection of civil rights through article I powers over voting, defense, 
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minded groups urged the Supreme Court to overturn or restrict its nineteenth-
century decisions in Plessy v. Ferguson 21 and the Civil Rights Cases ,22 so that 
discrimination could be eliminated in state government and some private orga-
nizations as a matter of constitutionallaw.23 These two different roots of title 
VI are significant because they explain the essential ambivalence concerning 
doctrine and implementation which have surrounded the statute since its 
passage. 
In 1947, seven years before the Court overruled the separate-but-equal doc-
trine,24 the President's Committee on Civil Rights25 issued its remarkable 
agenda for civil rights enforcement, To Secure These Rights ,26 which called for 
the programs and policies that Congress would later adopt in the civil rights 
acts of the 1960's.27 Although the report urged the overthrow of the separate-
interstate commerce, taxing and spending, postal system, District of Columbia, and territories) [herein-
after To SECURE THESE RIGHTS]. Congress has legislative power originating outside article I as well. 
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII,§ 2 (empowering Congress to abolish slavery by legislation); id. amend. 
XIV,§ 5 (empowering Congress to enforce fourteenth amendment by legislation); id. amend. XV,§ 2 
(empowering Congress to enforce voting rights by legislation); cf. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 
100 (1945) (upholding constitutionality of criminal statute prohibiting willful violation of fourteenth 
amendment). The Supreme Court, however, had viewed these powers as limited to enforcing the judi-
cially defined terms of the Civil War amendments. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-22,32 (1883) 
(fourteenth amendment does not authorize direct congressional regulation of private rights, but only 
correction of prohibited state action); cf. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 169, 173-74 (1970) 
(42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) requires same degree of state action as required for fourteenth amendment 
violation). Use of article I power to prohibit racial discrimination, therefore, would free Congress to 
develop its own definition of civil rights. 
21. 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (upholding constitutionality of separate but equal accommodations). 
22. 109 U.S. 3, 20-22, 32 (1883) (holding unconstitutional 1875 Civil Rights Act that prohibited dis-
crimination not involving state action). 
23. See generally R. KLUGER, SiMPLE JusTICE (1976) (describing litigation efforts of NAACP to ban 
segregation). 
24. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("Separate educational facilities are 
inherently unequal"). 
25. President Truman created the Committee by executive action for the sole purpose of preparing a 
report concerning "whether and in what respect current law-enforcement measures and the authority 
and means possessed by Federal, State, an~ local governments may be strengthened and improved to 
safeguard the civil rights of the people." Exec. Order No. 9808, 3 C.F.R. § 184 (Supp. 1946). The 
Committee should not be confused with the later United States Commission on Civil Rights, created by 
statute. Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, § 101, 71 Stat. 634 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1975 
(1976)). The Commission has existed since 1957, although it has described itself as a "temporary, 
independent, bipartisan agency." U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, A GENERATION DEPRIVED (frontis-
piece) (1977). It publishes regular reports on problems arising from discrimination and civil rights 
enforcement. See id. (presenting Commission's findings and recommendations concerning school de-
segregation efforts in Los Angeles). 
26. To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 20. 
27. The Committee offered many suggestions, including recommendations for a federal fair employ-
ment practice act, id. at 167, and for a public accommodations act, id. at 170-71, which were adopted in 
federal law in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & 
Supp. IV 1980) (employment discrimination); id. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1976) (public accommodations). 
Other recommendations also met with later congressional approval. Compare To SECURE THESE 
RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 160 (recommending abolition of poll taxes) with U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV 
(abolition of poll taxes in federal elections); To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 160-61 (rec-
ommending protection of right to vote) with Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 to 1973bb-4 
(1976) (enforcement of voting rights); To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 161 (recommending 
self government and suffrage for District of Columbia) with U.S. CoNST. amend XXIII (District of 
Columbia suffrage). Other committee suggestions were acted upon by the courts. Compare To SECURE 
THESE RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 166, 168 (recommending elimination of all segregation and enactment 
of state legislation to end segregation in education) with Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 
(1954) (segregation in public schools solely on basis of race violates equal protection clause of four-
teenth amendment); To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 169 (recommending renewed court 
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but-equal doctrine,28 the Committee's legislative proposals assumed that both 
Plessy and the Civil Rights Cases would remain in force, and recommended 
that Congress bypass them with affirmative legislation under, inter alia, the 
"taxing and spending powers."29 Presaging title VI, the Committee urged 
"[t]he conditioning by Congress of all federal grants-in-aid and other forms of 
federal assistance to public or private agencies for any purpose on the absence 
of discrimination and segregation based on race, color, creed, or national 
origin."30 
The subsequent revolution at the Supreme Court, however, gave equal im-
petus to those who took the constitutional approach to placing restraints on 
discriminatory use of federal funds. Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I)31 
put an end to government practice of segregation-the most blatant form of 
discrimination,32 but the Court went further after Brown, amending thenar-
row view of state action it had adopted in the Civil Rights Cases and announc-
ing that it was prepared to enforce desegregation directly against some private 
parties.33 Beginning in 1961, in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,34 the 
Supreme Court issued notice that private parties having commercial or 
financial dealings with state governments may be subject, under soQ.le circum-
stances, to the same standard of nondiscriminatory conduct that the fourteenth 
amendment imposes on the government itself.35 
The Burton case, which involved a commercial restaurant lease in part of a 
state-owned garage facility,36 led two years later to the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital,31 in which physicians 
attack upon restrictive covenants and enactment of state legislation outlawing restrictive covenants) 
with Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (judicial enforcement of covenants excluding persons of 
designated race from ownership of real property is state action violating equal protection clause of 
fourteenth amendment). 
28. See To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, supra note 20, at 81-82 (criticizing Plessy because segregation 
inherently creates inequality). 
29. I d. at 109; see id. at 104-12 (enumerating eleven specific constitutional bases for federal action in 
civil rights field). 
30. Id. at 166 (emphasis added). The emphasized language is important. Because se~regation was 
still constitutionally permissible at the time of the Committee's report in 1947, the incluston of "segre-
gation" in this passage demonstrates that this conceptual progenitor of title VI incorporated an expecta-
tion that Congress would enact legislation to reach practices not prohibited by the Constitution. 
31. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) [hereinafter Brown 1]. 
32. I d. at 493; see Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (requiring implementation of 
JJrown I "with all deliberate speed") [hereinafter JJrown II]. Although JJrown II did not articulate 
precisely what steps states ultimately would have to take, the Court made clear as early as 1958 that it 
would accept no state attempt to retain segregation. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1958) 
(refusing to allow postponement of desegregation even though efforts had impeded education of all 
students). See generally Hutchinson, Unanimity and .Desegregation: Oecisionmaking in /he Supreme 
Court, 1948-19.58, 68 GEo. L.J. I, 73-86 (1979) (discussing Court's internal decisionmaking process in 
Cooper). 
33. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961). 
34. Id. 
35. See id. at 726 (discrimination by private party who leases state property and derives benefit from 
adjoining state facility constitutes state action sufficient to violate fourteenth amendment). Later deci-
sions confined the holding. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164-65 (1978) (state statute 
allowing warehouseman's sale of goods on nonpayment of storage fee provides insufficient state in-
volvement to constitute state action under fourteenth amendment); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison 
Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358 (1974) (privately owned, state-regulated utility's termination of services for non-
payment not state action violative of fourteenth amendment). 
36. 365 U.S. at 722-25. 
37. 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (en bane), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 938 (1964). 
1981] TITLE VI AND "DISCRIMINATION" 7 
claimed that two private hospitals had discriminated on the basis of race in 
denying admittance to black physicians and patients.38 Judge Sobeloff, writing 
for the court en bane, found that the hospitals' receipt of construction grants 
under the federal Hill-Burton Act,39 which "appropriat[ed] millions of dollars 
of public monies pursuant to comprehensive governmental plans,"40 required 
that the private hospitals operate their programs in accordance with the guar-
antees of equal protection.41 Moreover, the court stated that federal agencies 
could not authorize grantees to take unconstitutional action but were con-
strained to ensure that grantees operated constitutionally.42 
These two doctrinal sources for title VI, the use of article I powers and the 
reliance on Constitution-based equal protection principles, surfaced repeatedly 
throughout the 1964 debates, as sponsors argued that the title was both wise 
social and moral policy as well as a restatement of the Burton and Simkins 
constitutional holdings. In the House hearings on the 1964 Act,43 the Civil 
Rights Commission took the lead in placing title VI on a high constitutional 
plane, arguing that the statute would merely enforce existing executive author-
ity to ensure that "federally assisted programs comply with the requirements of 
the .fifth and fourteenth amendents to the Constitution."44 The Commission 
viewed the law as primarily a procedural device for withholding federal funds 
until a state "demonstrates its compliance with the Constitution and laws of 
the United States."45 Civil rights organizations tended to support the Commis-
38. ld at 961. 
39. Hospital Survey and Construction (Hill-Burton) Act, Pub. L. No. 79-725, § 622(f), 60 Stat. 1041 
(1946) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 29lc(e) (1976)). Congress substantially amended the Act in 1964. 
See Hospital and Medical Facilities Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-443, §§ 2-625, 78 Stat. 447 
(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 291 to 29lo-l (1976)). It retained, however, the same underlying goal 
of promoting hospital construction through state planning and monetary grants. Compare Hospital Con-
struction Act: Hearings on S. 191 Before the Senate Comm. on Education and Labor, 79th Cong., lst 
Sess. 190 (1945) (remarks of Sen. Ellender) (primary purpose to furnish adequate health facilities for all 
people) with 42 U.S. C. § 291 (1976) (same). See also Co=ent, Provision of Free Medical Services by 
Hill-Burton Hospitals, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 351,383 (1973) (discussing problem of medical serv-
ices to poor). For a contemporary treatment of hospitals, providing background material useful in 
evaluating their status as state "actors," see Clark, J)oes the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry?, 
93 HARV. L. REV. 1416, 1426-28 (1980) (discussing governmental subsidies of health care industries, 
which account for approximately 60% of health care expenditures). 
40. 323 F.2d at 967. 
41. ld 
42. /d at 968. 
43. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 101-1106, 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h-6 (1976, Supp. II 1978 & Supp. IV 1980)). Following a presidential message 
on civil rights legislation on February 28, 1963, the House of Representatives promptly began consider-
ation of a set of bills that later yielded the 1964 Act. Civil Rights: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 5 of 
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., lst Sess. 907-08 (1963) (opening remarks of Chairman 
Celler) [hereinafter House Subcomm. Hearings]. In that same year, the Senate considered a narrow bill 
dealing only with public acco=odations. Civil Rights-Public Accommodations: Hearings on S. 1732 
Before the Senate r:omm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., lst Sess. 1 (1963) (opening remarks of Chairman 
Magnuson) [hereinafter Senate Hearings]. Final congressional action came after President Kennedy's 
death on November 22, 1963, and was facilitated by a strong statement from President Johnson that he 
supported the legislation and wished to see it enacted promptly. See H.R. Doc. No. 178, 88th Cong., 
lst Sess. 3, reprinted in 109 CONG. REc. 22,838, 22,839 (1963) (President Johnson addressing Joint 
Session of Congress on Nov. 27, 1963) (urging "earliest possible passage" of civil rights bill). 
44. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1103 (prepared statement of Berl Bernhard, Staff 
Director, U.S. Co='n on Civil Rights). 
45. See id at 1093 (testimony of Commissioner Spottswood W. Robinson III) (explaining earlier 
Commission reco=endations that President explore existing legal authority to withhold funds). 
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sion's view,46 some even arguing that the title was unnecessary because the 
Constitution already required what Congress proposed to do in title VI.47 
Others, however, thought title VI to be compelled not by the Constitution but 
by more general "national policy,"48 one Senator even equating the statute 
with the coinage motto "E Pluribus Unum."49 The confusion over whether 
title VI rested primarily on constitutional or primarily on other philosophical 
foundations was understandable, not only because the state of constitutional 
interpretation was continually evolving, 5° but also because the vast majority of 
grantees covered by the title were governments already subject to the four~ 
teenth amendment. s 1 
46. A curious split among the civil rights groups is detectable: white-dominated organizations 
tended to take the doctrinaire approach that title VI merely restated constitutional law, see note 47 
infra, while black-dominated groups saw the provision as having substantial independent value. See 
House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 2229 (testimony of James Farmer, National Director, 
Congress of Racial Equality) (title VI involves great principle that federal government should not sub-
sidize segregation); id. at 2160 (statement of Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary, NAACP) (Congress 
should clarify antidiscrimination policy independent of court decisions). Although aware that a connec-
tion could be drawn between title VI and constitutional law, the black-dominated civil rights groups 
tended to look upon discrimination as a systemic problem to be attacked by any practical means pro-
ducing results and without regard for doctrinal niceties. See id. at 2161-65 (statement of Roy Wilkins) 
(advocating mandatory termination of funds and shift of burden to school systems to show 
nondiscrimination). 
47. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 2406 (supplementary statement of Joseph 
Rauh, Vice Chairman, Americans for Democratic Action) (title VI "is not only constitutional, but is 
required by the Constitution"); cf. id. at 2122 (prepared statement of John Pemberton, Jr., Executive 
Director, American Civil Liberties Union) (suggesting withdrawal of title VI because President already 
had authority to withhold funds). At the time of these remarks title VI contained only a short declara-
tion of principle with none of the restrictive language it now contains. Its necessity, therefore, may have 
seemed less compelling at that stage of development. Compare note 148 i'!fra (quoting original text of 
title VI) with notes 140-41 i'![ra (quoting final text of title VI). Nevertheless, Mr. Raub's statement 
manifests his view that the origin of title VI, as then written, lay in the Constitution's equal protection 
principles. 
48. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1963, H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th 
Cong., lst Sess. 56 (1963), reprinted in [1964) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2391, 2425 (additional 
views of Rep. Meader) (federal government can and should incorporate national policy against dis-
crimination in financial aid grants) [hereinafter HousE JUDICIARY REPORT]. 
49. 110 CoNG. REC. 7061 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Pastore). 
50. At the early stages of the House debates, for example, Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hospital, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (en bane), cert. deniea, 376 U.S. 938 (1964), was still pending in 
the Fourth Circuit. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1541 (statement of HEW Secretary 
Celebrezze); see notes 37-42 supra and accompanying text (discussing Simkins). In addition, the 
Supreme Court had not yet handed down the first decision in which it defined the scope of its Brown II 
implementation decree. See Goss v. Board ofEduc., 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (decided June 3, 1963); note 
64 i'!fra (discussing Goss). 
51. See 45 C.F.R. pt. 80 app. A (Supp. 1966) (listing private and state-administered programs af-
fected by title). Congress was never able to establish with certainty the number of programs or the 
dollar value of grants that title VI would cover. See Letter from Deputy Attorney General Nicholas 
Katzenbach to Chairman Emanuel Celler, reprinted in Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 71.52 Before 1/1e 
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., lst Sess. 2773-79 (1963) (providing list of programs and 
activities involving federal financial assistance affected by title VI, but acknowledging impossibility of 
compiling complete list) [hereinafter House Comm. Hearings). Some opponents had argued that title 
VI would apply to private individuals who received payments from the government. See HousE JUDI· 
ClARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 69-70, reprinted in [1964) U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 2437-39 
(minority report) (admonishing that title VI would destroy freedom of contract for subsidized farmers 
and homeowners). Mr. Katzenbach's letter, however, stated that the Justice Department deemed such 
grants or payments to fall outside the coverage of title VI. See Letter from Deputy Attorney General 
Nicholas Katzenbach to Chairman Emanuel Celler, reprinted in House Comm. Hearings, supra, at 2773 
(noting that direct payments to individuals do not constitute aid to a "program or activity," as required 
by title VI). See also Co=ent, Tille VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-Implementalion and Impact, 36 
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 824, 837-38 (1968) (amendments resolved uncertainty by placing insurance and 
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Early developments indicated that these constitutional and legislative forces, 
although they drove toward the same social goal, were not altogether compati-
ble; most of the evidence of this dichotomy surfaced not in philosophical state-
ments but in the mechanics adopted by section 602 of title VI. 52 Congress 
realized that the scope of title VI's antidiscrimination principle clearly would 
not be self-evident in all contexts, and for that reason affected agencies-not 
courts-were empowered to adopt "rules, regulations, or orders" to guide their 
respective programs. 53 Significantly, Congress also directed that agencies draw 
these regulations with an eye not merely toward attaining single-minded com-
pliance with title VI's antidiscrimination principle but also toward maintaining 
"achievement of the objectives" of the various underlying federal authoriza-
tion statutes.54 Finally, by requiring presidential approval of all such regula-
tions,55 Congress frankly admitted that it desired the final implementing rules 
to bear strong political accountability, a goal theoretically at odds with the 
view that the origins of title VI lay exclusively in constitutional command. 56 
The differences in opinion regarding the philosophical origins of the statute 
mattered little in 1963 and 1964. In the euphoric days following the death of 
the "separate-but-equal" doctrine, but before the rise of two- and three-tier 
constitutional analysis,57 equal protection for most members of Congress had a 
rather clearly discernible substantive content that paralleled the command of 
section 601, the definitional section of title VI: do not discriminate on the basis 
of race, color, or national origin. 58 This primarily connoted an end to.segrega-
tion,59 and storm clouds over the consensus appeared to most as no more than 
a dispute over details. Section 602 authorized affected agencies and the Presi-
dent to clear up those details and proceed on a joint march with the federal 
courts to end a century of mistreatment of black Americans. 60 As in the early 
guaranty contracts beyond scope of title VI). Some viewed title VI favorably because of its broad 
reach. See 110 CoNG. REc. 7061 (1964) (remarks of Sens. Pastore and Hart) (title VI would obviate 
need to amend each grant statute individually). 
52. See 42 U.S.C. g 2000d-l (1976) (providing enforcement procedures for title VI); note 141 i'!fra 
(quoting final text of § 602). 
53. 42 u.s.c. § 2000d-l (1976). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 
56. Cf. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 407, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6 (1976) (authorizing Attorney General to 
institute school desegregation suits, using phrase "equal protection of the laws" as in Constitution 
rather than "discrimination" as in title VI). 
57. See .Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-132 (1969) (distin-
guishing two tiers of review under equal protection clause: "active review" of cases involving suspect 
classifications or fundamental interests and ''restrained review" of other cases); Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359 (1978) (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) ("mid-
dle tier" scrutiny used in sex discrimination cases also applies to affirmative action program). 
58. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976); see note 140 i'!fra (quoting text of§ 601). 
59. See Letter from Deputy Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to Chairman Emanuel Celler, 
reprinted in House Comm. Hearings, supra note 51, at 2774 (stating one pu~se of title VI to override 
existing federal law allowing assistance to segregated facilities); Comment, Title VI of the Civil Rights 
Act of 19M-Implementation and Impact, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 824, 828-29 (1968) (title VI intended 
to overrule existing federal statutes providing aid to segregated institutions). 
60. Title VI, with its directive to the President and federal agencies concerning funding termination, 
should be seen as only part of a wide-ranging attack contemplating that the executive department 
would also directly involve the judiciary in the effort t~ alleviate discrimination against blacks. See 42 
U.S.C. § 2000a-5 (1976) (authorizing suits by Attorney General to enforce public accommodation pro-
visions of title II); id. § 2000c-6 (1976) (authorizing suits by Attorney General against school boards 
violating fourteenth amendment). 
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stages of any revolution,61 conceptual origins seemed less important than the 
belief that all would work together to get the job done. 
2. Early Reception by Appellate Courts: the Primacy of Judicial Law 
In the five years following the passage of title VI, the executive and the judi-
ciary worked together to implement the statute, as Congress had envisioned. 
Despite hortatory language in some cases following Brown 1,62 the school de-
segregation effort that had begun in 1954 as constitutional litigation had by 
1964 bogged down in a slough of implementation details.63 The Supreme 
Court had spoken clearly only once on the mechanics of desegregation, 64 and 
its indecisiveness on that occasion reflected the Court's reluctance in the early 
61. See generally Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 320-28 (1934) (discussing conceptual origins 
and later disputes concerning sovereign immunity doctrine in postrevolutionary America); H. BERMAN, 
JusTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 13-96 (rev. ed. 1963) (discussing conceptual origins of Soviet law; disputes and 
changes following 1917 revolution); Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 
77 HARV. L. REv. 1, 2-19 (1963) (discussing changing view of sovereign immunity doctrine before and 
after American Revolution); Shirk, The 1963 Temporary Work Regulations for Full-Time Middle and 
Primary Schools: Commentary and Translation, 55 CHINA Q. 511, 511 (1973) (discussing educational 
policy disputes in postrevolutionary China). 
62. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218, 232 (1964) (ordering "quick and effective" 
desegregation); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 7 (1958) (ordering "earliest practicable completion" of 
desegregation plan); Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301 (ordering desegregation "with all deliberate speed"). 
63. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. ofEduc., 372 F.2d 836, 855 (5th Cir. 1966) (discussing 
court's difficulty in composing detailed administrative plans), qffd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cerl. 
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 18·21 (1961) (describing Variety 
of court decrees that apparently satisfy Brown II). See gen~rally HUMAN RIGHTS CASEFINDER 1953-69, 
at 105-18, 133-34 (A. Gingered. 1972) (providing extensive collection of representative cases). For the 
progress of a case illustrating the many obstacles that impeded successful desegregation, see Lee v. 
Macon County Bd. ofEduc., 221 F. Supp. 297 (M.D. Ala. 1963) (order to submit detailed desegregation 
plan); 9 RACE RELATIONS L. REP. 148 (M.D. Ala. 1964) (granting delay in instituting plan; granting 
temporary restrainin~ order requiring transfer of black students); 231 F. Supp. 743 (M.D. Ala. 1964) 
{per curiam) (prelimmary injunction prohibiting state from interfering with desegregation); 10 RACE 
RELATIONS L. REP. 588 (M.D. Ala. 1965) (modification of plan); 10 RACE RELATIONS L. REP. 1512 
(M.D. Ala. 1965) (transfer of some students; reconsideration of others); 253 F. Supp. 727 (M.D. Ala. 
1966) (per curiam) (order to institute freedom-of-choice plan); 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (per 
curiam) (requiring interim statewide desegregation plan); 270 F. Supp. 859 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (per 
curiam) (prohibiting cutoff of federal funds independent of court action); 12 RACE RELATIONS L. REP. 
1835 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (state teacher choice and tuition grant statutes unconstitutional); 12 RAcE RELA· 
TIONS L. REP. 1840 {M.D. Ala. 1967) (teacher desegregation order); 12 RACE RELATIONS L. REP. 1844 
(M.D. Ala. 1967) (order reopening schools closed by order of state court); 283 F. Supp. 194 (M.D. Ala. 
1968) (per curiam) (order to desegregate athletic programs); 289 F. Supp. 975 (M.D. Ala. 1968) (per 
curiam) (mem.) (conversion of temporary classrooms); 292 F. Supp. 363 (1968) (order to effect further 
faculty desegration and to close some schools). 
64. See Goss v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 683, 688 (1963) (transfer programs that promote segrega· 
tion invalid). The case involved a so-called "minority to majority" transfer provision that permitted 
students, following desegregative assignment by geographic zones, to transfer from a school in which 
their race was the minority to one in which their race was the majority. /d. at 684. The admitted 
purpose was to "permit a child [or his parents] to choose segregation.' /d. at 687 (quoting Superinten-
dent of Schools). The Court invalidated the transfer plan because it tended to perpetuate segregation 
and because race was the factor upon which the plans operated. I d. at 686, 688. The Court found it 
unnecessary to consider any other aspects of the overall desegregation plan and reserved judgment on 
whether unrestricted transfer provisions would prove acceptable. Id. at 688-89. That issue was not 
addressed by the Court for another five years. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 440-41 
(1968) ("freedom-of-choice" plans unacceptable unless they offer "real promise" of aiding desegrega-
tion). Although the Court expressed some dissatisfaction with the pace of desegregation, it showed 
little resolve to work out the problems itself. 373 U.S. at 689. It offered no guidance to the lower courts 
for further applying Brown II except to characterize the transfer plans cryptically as not "reasonably 
designed to meet legitimate local problems." Id. 
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1960's to make broad pronouncements on racial issues.65 Feder~l trial and ap-
pellate courts were left alone to treat the practical problems in greater detai1.66 
Seeking to aid the desegregation effort and armed with its authorization to 
enforce title VI's antidiscrimination principle,67 the Department of Health, Ed-
ucation and Welfare (HEW) adopted guidelines setting concrete targets for 
school desegregation. 68 In considering how to respond to HEW's standards, 
appellate courts were faced with a delicate question: were the standards synon-
ymous with those of the Constitution, and if not, which standards should 
prevail? 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the appellate court 
most affected by school desegregation problems,69 responded with an ambiva-
lence typical of judicial reaction to the HEW guidelines. Initially, the court 
welcomed the agency's show of support. Judge Wisdom, writing for the panel 
in Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School .District,10 noted: 
We attach great weight to the standards established by the Office of 
Education [of HEW]. The judiciary has of course functions and du-
ties distinct from those of the executive department, but in carrying 
out a national policy the three departments of government are united 
by a common objective. There should be a close correlation, there-
fore, between the judiciary's standards in enforcing the national pol-
icy requiring desegregation of public schools and the executive 
department's standards in administering this policy.71 
In addition to the moral support and encouragement that all southern fed-
65. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 726 (1961) (holding equal protection 
may apply to private lessee of state property, but discounting fears of "nigh universal application" of 
fourteenth amendment); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53 (1959) 
(holding literacy test not per se discriminatory, but condemning in dictum discriminatory implementa-
tion of tests). See also Bickel & Wellington, Le9islative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln 
Mills Case, 7l HARV. L. REv. I, 4 (1957) (criticizmg Court's early reluctance to articulate reasoning on 
racial issues as shown by per curiam reversals); Hutchinson, Sllpra note 32, at 60-73 (providing histori-
cal account of Court's use of per curiam reversals and refusals to hear cases apparently within its 
jurisdiction). 
66. See note 63 st~pra (illustrating complexity of problems facing lower courts). 
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976) (granting agency power to enforce§ 601). 
68. OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, GENERAL STATEMENT OF 
POLICIES UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964 RESPECTING DESEGREGATION OF ELE-
MENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS 45 C.P.R.§ 181 (Supp. 1966) [hereinafter 1965 GUIDELINES); 
OFFICE OF EDUCATION, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, REVISED STATEMENT OF PoLI-
CIES FOR SCHOOL DESEGREGATION PLANS UNDER TITLE VI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, 45 
C.P.R. § 181 (1967) [hereinafter REVISED GUIDELINES]; see Dunn, Title VI, The Guidelines and School 
.Desegre9ation in the South, 53 VA. L. REv. 42, 55-64 (1967) (discussing guidelines). Mr. Dunn, a legal 
advisor m the Office of Education of HEW, described the implementation of the 1965 Guidelines as an 
initial attempt to secure paper compliance. Dunn, st~pra, at 58-59. With the Revised Guidelines, the 
emphasis shifted toward testing the effectiveness of the plans. Id 
69. See Dunn, Sllpra note 68, at 73 (Fifth Circuit most prolific and progressive on subject of school 
desegregation). See generally J. BASs, UNLIKELY HEROES (1981) (describing Fifth Circuit's efforts to 
implement mandates of Brown II). At the time, the Fifth Circuit included the states of Georgia, Flor-
ida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1976). Other circuits substantially 
affected by the guidelines at this early date were the Fourth, Sixth (including Kentucky and Tennessee), 
and the Eighth (including Arkansas). See Dunn, Sllpra, at 71-76 (discussing resolution of "free choice" 
issue by various courts). 
70. 348 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1965) [hereinafter Singleton I]. 
71. Id at 731. 
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era! judges must have needed during this period,72 more objective reasons led 
the Fifth Circuit to welcome HEW's guidelines. First, the guidelines set out 
not one but two tests for compliance: either satisfaction of the department's 
detailed standards or compliance with a court's desegregation order.73 As the 
Singleton court perceptively realized, this had the practical, if unintended, ef-
fect of inducing courts either to adopt HEW's standards or to mimic them.74 
Otherwise, school districts could flaunt HEW's detailed standards and merely 
meet the second test of the guidelines by complying with "substantially less 
burdensome" judicial standards.75 In short, in order to ensure the integrity of 
title VI standards76 and to avoid a deluge of recalcitrant school boards seeking 
laxer rules in the federal courts,77 courts would have to match HEW's 
guidelines. 
Judge Brown, writing for the court in Price v . .Denison Independent Sclrool 
.District ,18 pinpointed another concern that led the Fifth Circuit to accept the 
HEW guidelines. The delayed-implementation decree of Brown v. Board of 
Education (Brown II),19 said Judge Brown, had caused great anxiety for lower 
court judges because it "inescapably puts the Federal Judge in the middle of 
school administrative l?roblems for which he was not equipped . . . ."80 The 
title VI guidelines eliniinated this problem by putting responsibility for admin-
istration "largely where it ought to be-in the hands of the Executive and its 
agencies with the function of the Judiciary confined to those rare cases present-
ing justiciable, not operational, questions.'~8 1 
The Fifth Circuit ini~ially implied, therefore, that executive and judicial 
concepts of equal protection should be brought into harmony82 and that the 
72. See J. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY MEN 9-12, 236-38 (1961) (describin~ harassment of fed-
eral judges for pre-Brown rulings and political pressure suffered for desegregation actions); Jud$es: 
Interpreters in the Front Line, TIME, May 12,1967, at 72-78 (describing bomb threats and local ostrac1sm 
of District Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. because of his desegregation decisions). 
73. 1965 GUIDELINES, supra note 68, §II, 45 C.P.R.§ 182.2 (Supp. 1966). HEW's earlier regulations 
under title VI had recognized the same distinction. See 45 C.P.R.§ 80.4(c)(l) (court approval) (Supp. 
1966); id § 80.4(c)(2) (agency approval). Whether adoption of such a bifurcated approach was neces-
sary or proper has been the subject of keen debate. Compare Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 270 F. 
Supp. 859, 865 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (three-judge court) (executive may not disapprove court-adopted plan 
by terminating funds) with Comment, The Courts_, HEW, and Southern School .Desegregation, 11 YALE 
LJ. 321, 324 (1967) (exception for court orders may be merely matter of administrative discretion). 
74. 348 F.2d at 731. 
75. Id 
76. Judge Wisdom referred in Singleton I to the possibility that school boards might try to satisl)' low 
judicial standards "as a means of circumventing" the explicit requirements contained elsewhere m the 
HEW guidelines. Id 
77. Id The Eighth Circuit's reasons for giving substantial deference to the HEW guidelines echoed 
those expressed in Singleton I. See Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14, 18-19 (8th Cir. 1965) (practicalities 
dictate that courts should model plans after executive standards). The other circuit most affected by 
title VI, the Fourth, refused to follow the guidelines, noting that while they gave a "persuasive gloss" to 
title VI, "the definition of constitutional standards ... is peculiarly a judicial function." Bowman v. 
County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1967). The question of whether HEW's rules could act 
as minimum standards arose ambiguously in Bowman, however, because, although HEW had approved 
the board's plan, id at 328, the plan may have failed to meet the guidelines' test for desegregatiOn. See 
id at 333 n.ll (Sobeloff, J., concurring specially) (comparing guidelines' recommended results with 
actual, less successful, results). 
78. 348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1965). 
79. 349 u.s. 294 (1955). 
80. 348 at 1013. 
81. Id at 1014. 
82. See Singleton I, 348 F.2d at 731 (advocating close correlation between judicial and executive 
standards of desegregation). 
1981] TITLE VI AND "DISCRIMINATION" 13 
judiciary should be willing to defer to HEW's special expertise when applying 
constitutional principles in the educational setting. 83 This rosy picture of per-
fect cooperation was short-lived, however, for when the Singleton case came 
again before the Fifth Circuit, 84 Judge Wisdom took a decide1y narrower view 
of the guidelines, adopting them only as "minimum standards of general 
application."85 
Exaggerated deference to HEW's guidelines failed in light of both of the 
practical factors which had earlier induced the Fifth Circuit to honor the 
guidelines. First, avoiding recalcitrant attempts to evade the standards 
through litigation required only that the guideliries be treated as minimum de-
segregation standards, not standards coterminous with judicially declared 
rules. If court decrees were at least as stiff as HEW's standards, school boards 
would have no incentive to try to circumvent the guidelines by obtaining a 
court decree. 86 Second, although southern judges sought the assistance of 
agency expertise, in Singleton Judge Wisdom quickly realized that the line be-
tween "operational" administrative problems and "justiciable" judicial 
problems87 was illusory. 88 A court has its own expertise when applying consti-
tutionallaw to educational policy, because the court determines what the Con-
stitution requires even if HEW experts find such relief to be educationally 
unsound. 89 Similarly, the administrative help that title VI offered, especially 
after revised standards were published in 1966,90 could be realized by adopting 
83. See id. (HEW better qualified than courts to weigh administrative difficulties of desegregation 
plans). The Fifth Circuit suggested that the HEW guidelines originated from judicial opinions and, 
therefore, saw little problem with allowing courts to adopt and enforce them. See United States v. 
Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 851 (5th Cir. 1966) (guidelines represent standards previ-
ously established by Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit}, affd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.}, cert. 
denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Dunn, supra note 68, at 58 n.85 (quoting Jefferson County). See also Bow-
man v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 1967) (noting guidelines reflect earlier judicial 
opinions). 
84. Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School Dist., 355 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1966) [hereinafter 
Singleton II]. 
85. Id. at 869 (emphasis in original). Judge Wisdom attached great weight to the HEW standards, 
but recognized that the courts should not abdicate their responsibility as interpreters of the Constitu-
tion. I d. 
86. See note 73 supra and accompanying -text (explaining two methods for showing title VI 
compliance). ~ 
87. See Price v. Denison Independent School Dist., 348 F.2d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 1966) (judicial 
function confined to deciding justiciable, not operational, questions). 
88. Cf. Singleton II, 355 F.2d at 869 (it is for courts alone to determine when operation of school 
system violates Constitution). For an incisive commentary on the actual expertise of HEW and its 
capacity to apply that expertise, see Comment, The Courts, HEW, and Southern School .Desegregation, 
77 YALE LJ. 321, 339-56 (1967). 
89. See Singleton II, 355 F.2d at 869 (HEW standards may be too low to meet constitutional require-
ments); Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14, 19 (8th Cir. 1965) (courts may require, under constitutional law, 
something more than, less than, or different from HEW guidelines). For example, in Singleton II, Judge 
Wisdom noted that courts since Brown had ordered the immediate admission to formerly all-white 
schools of the individual named plaintiffs in desegregation suits. 355 F.2d at 869-70. Certainly no 
educational or administrative reasons would lead the court to overrule itself on that point. See United 
States v. Jefferson County Bd. ofEduc., 372 F.2d 836, 849 (5th Cir. 1966) (court has duty to desegregate 
while recognizing political, social, and moral aspects of problem}, affd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); Singleton II, 355 F.2d at 869 (administrative problems cannot justify 
denial of constitutional rights). Nevertheless, for most problems arising from class-wide relief, the 
HEW guidelines provided invaluable assistance to the courts. 372 F.2d at 849. 
90. See note 68 supra (citing REVISED GUIDELINES). The Revised Guidelines rendered ineffective 
the "freedom-of-choice" plan as a desegregation device (previously supported by school boards because 
it did not in fact lead to desegregation) and concentrated on more specific techniques and numerical 
results. See Dunn, supra note 68, at 59-64 (explaining that Revised Guidelines added new requirements· 
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the guidelines as a judicial minimum. The Fifth Circuit admitted in Um~ed 
States v. Jefferson County Board of Education91 that case-by-case appellate de-
velopment of the law was a poor way to ensure reasonably prompt and uni-
form desegregation.92 The 1966 guidelines relieved the pressure by providing 
minimum standards binding on district court judges,93 thereby leaving the ap-
pellate courts free to monitor only the remaining details.94 
The early judicial response to title VI, therefore, showed that federal courts 
were willing to accord the statute an ancillary, but not co-equal, role in enforc-
ing national antidiscrimination policy. When appellate courts found HEW's 
standards to be minimally suitable they were willing to allow the Department 
to share the burden of justifying relief decrees in the face of public hostility. 
They reserved, however, the power to dictate that the Constitution required 
higlier standards than those mandated by an agency. These courts maoe no 
suggestion that HEW officials had misconstrued title VI or acted outside their 
statutory authority by adopting standards less stringent than what courts inter-
preted the Constitution to require.95 Rather, the courts assumed that it was a 
permissible interpretation of title VI to allow the antidiscrimination standards 
of agencies to vary from those of the Constitution.96 The view of title VI as a 
wise legislative policy rather than as a mere restatement of constitutional law 
had apparently prevailed: in an area of article I competence, Congress and 
executive agencies could require much of federal grantees, but courts, when 
for voluntary desegregation in freedom-of-choice plans); if. Bowman v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 
326, 333 n.ll (1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring specially) (demonstrating that freedom-of-choice plans in 
two Virginia counties ineffective). 
91. 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), qffd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), eerl. denied, 389 U.S. 840 
(1967). 
92. Id at 854-55. By 1967 the Fifth Circuit had reviewed 41 school districts, many several times, and 
had issued 76 orders in the process. Id at 860 & n.51. District courts had confronted 128 desegregation 
cases and had issued 513 orders. Id Judge Wisdom complained of a ''wide lack of uniformity" and a 
"time-lag" in district court enforcement of circuit standards. Id at 860. 
93. Cf. id ("In certain cases-we consider unnecessary to cite-there has been a manifest variance 
between this Court's decision and a later district decision"). Some of the illustrative cases that Judge 
Wisdom chose not to cite are discussed in critical and embarrassing detail in J. PELTASON, FIFTY· 
EIGHT LONELY MEN 7-8, 110 (1961). 
94. Although the Fifth Circuit stressed in Jefferson County that the guidelines were to serve as mini-
mum standards, it tacitly admitted that it reluctantly might permit exceptional plans to fall below them: 
"In evaluating desegregation plans, district courts should make few exceptions to the Guidelines and 
should carefully tailor those so as not to defeat the policies of HEW or the holding of this Court." 372 
F.2d at 848. 
95. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 886-88 (5th Cir. 1966) (HEW 
guidelines requiring affirmative desegregation efforts consistent with title VI and valid as minimum 
standards), qffd en bane, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), eert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967); if. Lau v. Nichols, 
414 U.S. 563, 571 (1974) (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J., concurring in result) (regulation 
and guidelines statutorily correct and therefore control disposition of title VI case). 
96. Because HEW chose to model its guidelines after court decisions and the courts chose to give the 
guidelines great deference, the precise question whether title VI guidelines could vary from court-de-
clared standards never specifically arose. In Jefferson County_, Judge Wisdom stated that the guidelines 
"are required by the Constitution." 372 F.2d at 848. He followed that declaration, however, with an 
expression of willingness to permit exceptions. See id (exceptions to guidelines should be few and 
carefully restricted). Later in the opinion, Judge Wisdom rejected the school board's argument that 
certain provisions of title VI did not permit busing or assignment of teachers with the p,ronouncement 
that "we deal here with constitutional rights and not with those established by statute. ' Id at 883-84 
(quoting Smith v. Board ofEduc., 365 F.2d 770, 784 (8th Cir. 1966)). In short, the court welcomed the 
support of Congress and HEW in achieving desegregation, but when title VI and the guidelines de-
parted from judicial views, the court was prepared to support its views by resort to the Constitution 
Slone. See also Kemp v. Beasley, 352 F.2d 14, 19 (8th Cir. 1965) (in reviewing desegregation plan 
courts not bound by guidelines but only by Constitution). · 
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the Constitution commanded it, could require more.97 
As the first round of school desegregation ended in the late 1960's,98 federal 
courts had asserted the primacy of judicial law-the Constitution-over the 
less protective legislative law-title VI. When desegregation moved outside 
the South, to areas where detecting violations was of more immediate concern 
than formulating remedies, a curious role reversal took place. HEW's title VI 
regulations appeared to demand more of govemmentru grantees than did the 
Constitution.99 It was unclear whether federal courts would continue to give 
primacy to the Constitution, making judicial law both the ceiling and the floor 
on federal rights, or whether they would view title VI as an orilinary statute, 
incapable of diminishing constitutional principle but capable of extending 
it.100 
97. Laying aside the question whether the guidelines mimicked court decisions or the courts the 
guidelines, it is ironic that the appellate courts systematically began to enforce Brown II only as a result 
oflegislative and agency proddirig. The cross-pollination between court and agency is even more strik-
ing at the Supreme Court level. The Court, for example, declined to invalidate all freedom-of-choice 
plans in 1963. See Goss v. Board ofEduc., 373 U.S. 683, 688-89 (1963) (invalidating freedom-of-choice 
transfer plan based on race, but reserving judgment on validity of unrestricted transfer provisions); note 
64 supra (discussing freedom-of-choice plans and Goss). This undoubtedly led HEW to permit free-
dom-of-choice plans in both its original and revised guidelines. In the other direction, the Revised 
Guidelines reflected HEW's apparent disapproval of freedom-of-choice plans by requiring numerically 
favorable results for those plans; this certainly influenced the Supreme Court in its later decision to 
restrict the use of such plans. See Green v. County School Bd., 39fU.S. 420,432 n.2, 439 (1968) (citing 
REVISED GUIDELINES, supra note 68, without comment and subjecting freedom-of-choice plans to close 
judicial supervision). 
98. In 1968 the Supreme Court broke almost a decade and one-half of silence on implementation 
issues by insisting upon complete enforcement of the Brown decree in the states that had practiced de 
jure segregation. See Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) (requiring desegregation 
plan to produce immediate results). See also Northcross v. Board of Educ., 397 U.S. 232, 235 (1970) 
(per cunam) (same); Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Bd., 396 U.S. 290, 292 (1970) (per curiam) 
(same); Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (per curiam) (same). The 
Court heard its final case of this era in 1971, when it again confirmed the work of the lower courts 
rather than laying down new rules. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 28 
(1971) (canvassing and approving techniques for desegregation prescribed by district court). This pe-
riod, to paraphrase Winston Churchill, marked the end of the beginning rather than the beginning of 
the end. See generally TEXAS ADVISORY COMM., U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT: SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION IN CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS 14-16, 76-81 (1977) (background discussion of segrega-
tion in Corpus Christi schools; findings and proposed desegregation plans). 
99. This was due primarily to the "effects" analysis that the regulations and guidelines adopted. 
Because segregated housing patterns prevailed in the North and West, the use of neighborhood school 
zones necessarily had the ejfect of establishing highly segregated school systems, or de facto segrega-
tion. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 217-19, 236 (1973) (Powell, J., 
concurring) (de facto segregation due to housing patterns must be corrected). See generally U.S. 
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STAFF REPORT: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN KALAMAZOO, MICHIGAN 1-2 
(1977) (discussing segregation in Kalamazoo schools); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, STAFF REPORT: 
ScHOOL DESEGREGATION IN COLORADO SPRINGS, COLO. 1 (1977) (discussing segregation in Colorado 
Springs schools). Supreme Court cases dealing with such discrimination in constitutional tenns have 
been marked by use of evidentiary techniques to stretch previously accepted constitutional principles, 
see Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. at 207-211 (burden-shifting); loss of unanimity and an in-
crease in closely split decisions, id at 254 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v. Penick, 
443 U.S. 449, 469 (1979) (Stewart, J.) (explaining split opinions); reversals of lower court findings of 
discrimination, see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406 (1977) (.Dayton I); limitations on 
remedies, see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 
U.S. 424 (1976); and finally, analytical conversions of the cases into one fitting the traditional southern 
model of de jure segregation). See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979) (.Dayton II); 
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. at 525 (Rehnquist, J., joined by Powell, J., dissenting). By 
1979 the constitutional aspects of school desegregation outside the South had severely fractured the 
Court. See Columbus Bd. ofEduc. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 468-69 (1979) (Burger, C.J.) (noting diver-
sity of opinions among members of Court). 
100. q: Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (title II of 1964 Civil 
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B. THE STATUTE'S ROLE RE-EXAMINED: THE PRIMACY OF LEGISLATIVE LAW 
1. The Lau Decision 
Lau v. Nicho!s, 101 decided in 1974 after the first wave of southern school 
desegregation, 1°2 was the first Supreme Court case to arise under title VI. In 
Lau, the Court suggested that title VI might play a substantial role in supple-
menting the antidiscrimination command of the fourteenth amendment. 103 
The case involved a suit by non-English-speaking students of Chinese ancestry 
who claimed that San Francisco school officials had failed to provide adequate 
and equal instruction for them, violating their rights under both the equal pro-
tection clause and title VI. 104 Lower courts had denied relief on the theory that 
the educators had not intentionally discriminated against this group of stu-
dents and had provided the same educational opportunity to all students 
within the system.105 The Ninth Circuit stated that any resulting inequality 
derived not from discrimination, but from the "different ad van tapes and disad-
vantages" that each "student brings to the starting line of his educational 
career."106 
Justice Douglas' opinion for a unanimous Court rejected this theory, hold-
ing that in the context of California's requirements of compulsory education 
and English proficiency for graduation, 107 there was "no equality of treat-
ment" because the non-English-speaking students were "effectively foreclosed 
from any meaningful education."108 The Court declined, however, to base its 
conclusion on the Constitution, 109 instead relying upon the "effects test" for 
discrimination adopted by HEW's title VI regulations. 110 The Court noted that 
HEW guidelines specifically addressed the language problem for national-ori-
Rights Act prohibits private discriminatory acts affecting commerce even though Constitution alone 
does not). 
101. 414 u.s. 563 (1974). 
102. See note 98 supra (discussing cases in "first wave"). 
103. Id at 566. 
104. Id- at 564-65. 
105. See Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791, 796 (9th Cir. 1973). The school system previously had under-
gone a general desegregation plan as a result of federal litigation. See Lee v. Johnson, 404 U.S. 1215, 
1218 (1971) (denying stay of district court decree ordering reassignment of Chinese students within San 
Francisco public schools); Johnson v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 339 F. Supp. 1315, 1324-25 
(N.D. Cal. 1971) (ordering district to provide racial and ethnic balance among students by busing). 
106. 483 F.2d at 797. 
107. 414 U.S. at 565-66. The requirements are codified in California law. See CAL. Eouc. CoDE 
§§ 71, 8573 (West Supp. 1973) (current version at§§ 30, 51225 (West 1978)) (requiring English profi-
ciency in public schools); id § 12101 (West Supp. 1973) (current version at§ 48200 (West 1978)) (re-
quiring attendance at school). 
108. 414 U.S. at 566. 
109. The Court had faced a similar issue in 1966, when it was called upon to decide the constitution-
ality of a New York law requiring English literacy as a prerequisite to voting. See Cardona v. Power, 
384 U.S. 672, 673 (1966). Instead of reaching the constitutional question, the Court remanded the case, 
id at 674, for reconsideration in ligllt of a statutory decision it had rendered the same day. See Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, M7 (1966) (New York literacy requirement unenforceable to extent 
inconsistent with federal Voting Rights Act). Justice Douglas, the author of Lau, dissented from the 
Court's action in Cardona on the ground that the Court should have reached the constitutional issue. 
384 U.S. at 675-77 (Douglas, J., with Fortas, J., dissenting). 
110. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. at 566. The Court, quoting from HEW regulations, stated: 
Discrimination is barred which has that tjfect even though no purposeful design is present: a 
recipient "may not . . . utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of 
subJecting individuals to discrimination" or have "the effect of defeating or substantially im-
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gin minority students111 and directed that affected schools "must take affirma-
tive steps" to open their programs to such persons.112 
In retrospect the Court's decision to defer to federal administrators in Lau 
appears to have been the high-water mark for federal judicial willingness to 
halt state conduct which did not rather obviously stem from intentional state-
iniated discrimination. 113 Indeed, the difficult issue of whether the equal pro-
tection clause forbids only intentional discrimination, a question avoided in 
Lau, came to the Court twice in the three terms following that decision and the 
Court resoundingly decided it in the affirmative both times. 114 In adopting an 
effects test for title VI in Lau, therefore, the Court must have been aware that it 
was recognizing a distinction between the statute and constitutional principles. 
The Court also must have known that this departure from the intent standard 
would yield a title VI that expanded upon and supplemented the antidis-
crimination theme of the equal protection clause. IIS 
Moreover, the Lau Court implicitly rejected a possible reading of the early 
appellate decisions under title VI, that the supplementary role of the statute 
extended only to defining remedies for fourteenth amendment violations. 116 
Lau quite clearly considered title VI to be more than simply a remedy for 
equal protection violations. The Court relied on the statute, and its underlying 
regulations, to define a violation as any action that has the "effect" of denying 
educational opportunities to national-origin minorities. 117 Indeed, the Court 
declined to rule on whether the defendants had violated the fourteenth amend-
ment, but instead found that they had violated the substantive prohibitions of 
title VI. I Is The ancillary role that the Court saw for title VI in 197 4, therefore, 
was to provide supplemental substance to the fourteenth amendment, not 
merely to provide supplemental enforcement procedures for it. 
pairing accomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect individuals of a particular 
race, color, or national origin." 
Id at 568 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1970)) (emphasis in original). 
Ill. 414 U.S. at 568. 
112. Id (quoting 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970)). 
I 13. C.f. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967) (no persuasive reasons to overturn state 
supreme court judgment invalidating state constitutional amendment on federal constitutional 
grounds). See also C. ABERNATHY, CIVIL RIGHTS 92 (1980) (Reitman high-water mark in Warren 
Court's ·willingness to find state action). 
I 14. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-71 (1977) 
(equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment incorporates intent standard); Washington v. Davis, 
426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976) (equal protection component of fifth amendment incorporates intent 
standard). 
I 15. The Lau Court's awareness that constitutional claims would require proof of intent but could be 
supplemented by statutes adopting an effects test is illustrated by two earlier decisions. Compare Keyes 
v. School Dist. No. I, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 201-03 (1973) (Brennan, J.) (constitutional claim of 
school segregation requires proof that school authorities pursued intentionally segregative policy) with 
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971) (title VII claim of employment discrimination 
may succeed with proof of discriminatory effect). 
116. Because the Fifth Circuit decisions involved cases in which the courts had made prior findings 
of discrimination, unaided by the then-unformulated title VI guidelines, it is possible that the guide-
lines provided not a definition of wrongs constituting "discrimination," but only a remedy for those 
wrongs. C.f. R. BORK, THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PRESIDENT'S BUSING PROPOSALS (1972) (bus-
ing proposals adopted by Congress not unconstitutional because provide remedy for, and not definition 
or; wrong). 
I 17. 414 U.S. at 566. 
118. Id 
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2. Bakke and Its Limits 
Four years later, in Regents of the University of Calffornia v. Bakke, 119 the 
Court reopened the question of the role of title VI and cast doubt on its hold-
ing in Lau. Bakke, a white applicant for admission to a state medical school, 
charged that he was denied admission because of his race.120 He based his 
claim on the school's affirmative action program, which partially segregated 
the admissions process and applied different admissions criteria to applicants 
on the basis of race.121 He argued that this procedure violated both his consti-
tutional right to equal protection and his statutory right under title VI not to be 
subjected to discrimination in the university's federally-supported pro-
grams. 122 Although the California Supreme Court decided the case on equal 
protection grounds, 123 the United States Supreme Court, following its usual 
practice of disposing of a case whenever possible through statutory rather than 
constitutional interpretation, 124 ordered argument on the title VI claim. 12S 
A majority of the justices, however, found it impossible to avoid the consti-
tutional issue.126 Their investigation convinced them that Congress had, in the 
words of Justice Powell, intended "incorporation of a constitutional standard 
into Title VI,"127 and that, in in the words of Justices Brennan, White, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun (the Brennan coalition), "as applied to the case before us, 
Title VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment itself."128 Consequently, five mem-
bers of the Court found that the statutory issue merged with the constitutional 
issue, requiring an interpretation of the equal protection clause.129 
119. 438 u.s. 265 (1978). 
120. Id at 272-77 (opinion of Powell, J., joined as to this statement of facts by a majority of the 
Court). 
121. Id See generally A. SINDLER, BAKKE, DEFUNIS, AND MINORITY ADMISSIONS 49·86 (1978) (pro• 
viding detailed discussion of facts of Bakke). 
122. 438 U.S. at 277-78. Before initiating his court case Bakke had filed a title VI complaint against 
the university with the San Francisco regional office of HEW. See A. SJNDLER, supra note 121, at 78-79 
(discussing procedural background of case). 
123. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 63,553 P.2d 1152, 1172, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 
700 (1976), qff'd in part, rev'd in part, 4~8 U.S. 265 (1978). 
124. 438 U.S. at 281 (opinion of Powell, J.) (Court will not pass on constitutional question if other 
basis for disposition exists) (citing Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) 
(Brandeis, J., concurring}). 
125. 434 U.S. 900 (1977) (order to file supplemental brief). 
126. See 438 U.S. at 281, 284-87 (opinion of Powell, J.); id at 328-40 (opinion of Brennan, White, 
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). The remamingjustices deemed it unnecessary to decide the constitutional 
issue because, in their view, title VI on its face required that no person be "excluded from" any covered 
program. Id at 412 (opinion of Stevens, J., witli Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.) (quoting 42 
U.S.C. § 2000(d) (1964)). The medical school was a covered program, and the "plain language of the 
statute therefore require[ d) affirmance" of the California court's judgment for Bakke. Id 
127. Id at 286. Elsewhere, Justice Powell referred to the title VI prohibition on discrimination as 
"similar to that of the Constitution." Id at 284 (emphasis added). He offered no explanation for the 
difference in statements, and the language quoted in the text displays what appears to be the major 
thrust of the opinion. See id at 285 (noting that many supporters believed title VI "enacted constitu-
tional principles"). 
128. 438 U.S. at 325. Like Justice Powell's opinion, the opinion of the Brennan coalition uses 
phrases of varying intensity to indicate how closely title VI relates to the Constitution, but the quoted 
statement appears to express the major thrust of the opinion. 
129. Although reaching the same conclusions in Bakke, Justice Powell and the Brennan coalition 
developed opinions with substantially different flavors. The Brennan group focused on refuting the 
dissent's view that title VI forbade affirmative action that excluded whites; thus, they directed their 
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Looking back on the Bakke decision inBoard of Education v. Harris, 130 Jus-
tice Stewart, in dissent, read the earlier case as one in which "[f]ive Members 
of the Court concluded that Title VI . . . prohibits only discrimination viola-
tive of the Fifth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth."131 Because only intentional discrimination violates equal protection 
principles, he continued, title VI must also demand discriminatory intent.132 
Such an argument, of course, would mean the implicit overruling of Lau v. 
Nichols and would limit the ancillary role of title VI to a primarily procedural 
one-imposing constitutional standards on all federal grantees and providing 
a means for enforcement by terminating funds. Moreover, Justices Brennan, 
White, Marshall, and Blackmun frankly admitted in Bakke that they enter-
tained "serious doubts concerning the correctness of what appears to be the 
premise of [the Lau] decision."I33 
Despite their doubts, the former Brennan coalition, together with Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Stevens, 134 refused in Harris to overrule Lau .13s The 
reluctance to determine the precise contours of title VI was consistent with the 
coalition's analysis in Bakke. There they explicitly stated that title VI should 
be read to be coextensive with the equal protection clause, but predicated their 
decision upon the administrative regulations under title VI as well as constitu-
tional premises.t36 
Because both Congressional and administrative interpretations of title VI 
attention toward showing that the words of title VI could not be taken literally. That led them in tum 
to focus not only on the Constitution as a guide to intei]>retation, but also on HEW's permissive regula-
tions, to which they devoted considerable attention. See id at 341-45 (opinion of Brennan, White, 
Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) (regulations entitled to "considerable deference in construing Title VI"). 
This emphasis on the regulations, absent from Justice Powell's opinion, may be significant because it is 
primarily the regulations that vary from constitutional standards, particularly in their adoption of the 
"effects" test used in Lau. See note 110 supra (quoting Court's opinion in Lau). 
130. 444 u.s. 130 (1979). 
131. Id at 160 (Stewart, J., with Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting). 
132. Id 
133. 438 U.S. at 352. 
134. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens adhered to the position they had taken in Bakke, 438 
U.S. at 418-19, which was to read the statute at issue independently of the fourteenth amendment. 444 
U.S. at 149. Justice Powell, dissenting in Harris, also maintained consistency with his position in 
Bakke by reading the statute in conjunction with the fourteenth amendment and requiring proof of 
intentional discrimination. 444 U.S. at 160. The position of the majority in Harris, however, appears 
to be contrary to the position those justices took in Bakke. Compare Harris, 444 U.S. at 149 Qeaving 
open question whether title VI limited by fourteenth amendment) with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 352 (oi>inion 
of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackniun, JJ.) (title VI no broader than Constitution). In adaition, 
Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, dissenting in Harris, appeared to take a view different from their posi-
tion in Bakke. Compare Harris, 444 U.S. at 160 (Stewart, J., with Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) 
(title VI incorporates constitutional standard) with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 417-18 (opinion of Stevens, J., 
with Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.) (title VI can proscribe conduct Constitution does not). 
135. 444 U.S. at 149. The precise issue in Harris was whether Congress had adopted an intent or an 
effects test in determining eligibility for federal funding under the Emerg~ncy School Aid Act (ESAA), 
20 U.S.C. §1! 1601-1619 (1976) (current version at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3191-3207 (Supp. III 1979)). ESAA is 
an outgrowth of earlier efforts, dating from the Civil Rights Act of 1964, by which Congress sought to 
aid special efforts to promote integration. See id § 3192(b) (purpose to assist in desegregation of 
schools). In Harris the school board contended that the ineligibility test of the statute should be read in 
parallel with title VI, which it contended now possessed an intent requirement. 444 U.S. at 139. The 
Court held that because ESAA could be interpreted on its own terms, there was no need to decide the 
issue of its congruence with title VI or the scope of title VI. Id at 149. The Court, however, labored 
painfully to establish that the two statutes could adopt different tests. See id at 146 n.lO, 150 n.l3 
(legislative histories of ESAA and title VI indicate two acts need not be entirely interdependent). 
136. 438 U.S. at 341-45. The coalition pointedly noted that "Congress specifically eschewed any 
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favored the Brennan coalition's result, its statement that "Title VI's definition 
of racial discrimination is absolutely coextensive with the Constitution's" !37 
was unnecessary for decision of the case; the pertinent inquiry is not whether 
Congress intended to adopt equal protection principles as the source for title 
VI's standards, but whether it adopted constitutional standards as the exclusive 
determinant of title VI prohibitions, eliminating the relevance of administra-
tive interpretation. That issue was unnecessary for decision in Bakke, pain-
fully avoided in Harris, and most critical to the proper interpretation of title 
VJ.I38 
II. TITLE VI AND THE ART OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
I. Principles and Institutions 
Although the Bakke Court was deeply divided, all of the justices implicitly 
agreed upon one issue: title VI could not be treated as a constitutionally com-
pelled statute, as a mere legislative restatement of what the Constitution al-
ready required. 139 But what role was title VI to play? The legislative history 
static definition of discrimination in favor of broad language that could be shaped by experience, admin· 
istrative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine." I d. at 337 (emphasis added). 
137. Id. at 352. 
138. The United States Court of Appeals for the the Second Circuit, the court most troubled by the 
issue, has split on how to read the Supreme Court's interpretations of title VI. The first case to present 
the issue to the Second Circuit was the one that later became the Supreme Court decision of Harris. 
Board of Educ. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1978), affd on other grounds sub. nom. Board of Educ. 
v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979). The court, including two visiting judges, upheld the use of an effects test 
in an employment case arising under title VI, relying in part on an analogy to title VII's effects test and 
in part on Lau. I d. at 587-88. In the first case following the Supreme Court's decision in Harris, how-
ever, the Second Circuit panel adopted an intent test for title VI in the context of school desegregation, 
drawing an analogy to title IV of the 1964 Act and holding that it employed an intent test. See Parents 
Ass'n v. Ambach, 598 F.2d 705, 715-16 (2d Cir. 1979). A year later the circuit faced a claim that 
emotionally disturbed students were suffering racial discrimination and once again held that title VI 
required proof of intent, citing to Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Harris. See Lora v. Board of 
Educ., 623 F.2d 248, 250 (2d Cir. 1980) (title VI standard same as constitutional standard). Judge 
Oakes wrote separately to emphasize his view that Lau was still good law. Id. at 251-52 (Oakes, J., 
concurring). Disposition of the case again depended upon the vote of a district judge sitting by designa-
tion. I d. at 249. Five weeks following Lara, a panel majority consisting of Judge Newman and Chief 
Judge Feinberg refused to apply either Lara or Ambach to a suit alleging racial discrimination in the 
closmg of a hospital. Bryan v. Koch, 627 F.2d 612,616-17 (2d Cir. 1980) (appeal from denial of prelim-
inary injunction). The court held that even if the effects test were applicable, the defendant had justi-
fied the disparate impact of its actions sufficiently to defeat the plaintiffs' claim. I d. Judge Kearse, in 
dissent, argued that the regulations adopted pursuant to title VI required the "effects" test to be the 
guiding standard in such cases. Id. at 621-23 (Kearse, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The Third Circuit recently faced the same problem seen in Bryan, and ruled that title VI requires no 
proof of intent. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 2032, 2033 (3d Cir. June 29, 1981) (en 
bane). The effects test, however, did not require a finding of violation because the defendant demon-
strated business necessity for its actions. Id. 
A panel of the Fifth Circuit has concluded that Bakke requires proof of intent in title VI cases, 
although it admitted confusion over the current status of Lau. See Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 
1007 (5th Cir. 1981) (school's ability-grouping system based on racial and ethnic criteria not violative of 
title VI because statute does not prohibit benignly motivated discrimination). 
139. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (title 
VI legislatively adopts by reference the constitution's equal protection standard); id. at 336 (opinion of 
Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) (title VI not constitutionally compelled); id. at 416 (opin-
ion of Stevens, J., with Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.) (title VI has independent force in aCidi-
tion to that of Constitution). 
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allows us to conclude further that Congress also did not intend in section 
601 140 to adopt constitutional principle which section 602141 would then 
merely procedurally enforce; rather Congress adopted philosophical constitu-
tional principle knowing that it would be tempered by other non-constitutional 
considerations. More tellingly, Congress saw title VI not as one more vehicle 
for enforcement ofjudiciallaw and principle, but as a new, though somewhat 
parallel, source of legislative law and principle. 
The wording of title VI, its legislative history, and its relation to other provi-
sions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 show that Congress intended to enshrine a 
policy of nondiscrimination in the use of federal program funds that was to be 
responsive to agency expertise and to congressional political desires. It was to 
reflect, and to draw upon, judicial law under the Constitution but would be 
within what Congress viewed as the swift and flexible control of federal agen-
cies, not lumbering judicial processes. 
2. The Focus of Inquiry: H.R. 7152 
The Bakke Court's inquiry into the interpretation of title VI properly began 
with the notation that the word "discrimination," which appears in the prohib-
itory language of section 601 of title VI, has no fixed meaning.142 Definitions 
of discrimination may run the gamut from demanding intentional causation to 
140. Section 601 of title VI provides: "No person in the United States shall, on the ground ofrace, 
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d 
(1976). 
141. Section 602 of title VI provides: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assist-
ance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of 
insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d 
[§ 601] of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or 
orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of 
the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. 
No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the 
President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected 
(I) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue assistance under such program or 
activtty to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after 
opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termiriation or 
refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to 
whom such a finding has been made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular pro-
gram, or part therof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other 
means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the 
department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure 
to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by 
voluntary means. In the case of any action, terminating, or refusing to comply with a require-
ment imposed pursuant to this section, the head of the Federal department or agency shall file 
with the committees of the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program 
or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. 
No such action shall become effective until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such 
report. 
42 u.s.c 2000d-l (1976). 
142. See 438 U.S. at 284 (opinion of Powell, J.) (concept of "discrimination" susceptible of varying 
interpretations); id at 337-38 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) (Congresses-
chewed static definition of "discrimination"). Justice Stevens, in dissent, attempted to impart specific 
meaning to the word "discrimination," but he relied principally on the more easily defined word "ex-
cluded." See id at 413-14 (opinion of Stevens, J., with Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.) (clear 
language of statute precludes qualification of word "exclusion"). Justice Stevens was incorrect; Con-
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requiring only discriminatory impact or effect. Turning to the legislative rec-
ord to determine which meaning Congress intended, and employing as their 
favored technique the quotation of congressional debaters, the judicial histori-
ans in Bakke relied on numerous excerpts to prove their points.143 This 
method of historical inquiry has dubious value in the easiest of cases144 and 
decisively fails to give an accurate picture of the making oflegislation in such a 
charged atmosphere as that surrounding adoption of title VI. Members of the 
legislative branch, no less than those of the judicial, recognize that constitu-
tional rhetoric strengthens a difficult argument, and it is not surprising, there-
fore, that those who rely on quotations can find many in the title VI debates 
that allude to constitutional principles. Sifting of quotations, however, sim-
plistically treats the legislative history of title VI and obscures the complex 
"dance oflegislation"145 that produced that provision. The Congress that con-
sidered title VI was aware of the ambiguity inherent in the word "discrimina-
tion," and indeed this central definitional problem set the agenda for 
legislative action. Congress, however, resolved the problem not with a flurry 
of rhetoric, but with a carefully constructed compromise. 
The bill that Congress ultimately enacted began as H.R. 7152,146 an omni-
bus bill designed to alleviate racial discrimination in voting, public accommo-
dations, public education, federally assisted programs, and employment.147 
The provision regarding federally funded programs, then as now labeled title 
VI, 148 had two purposes. First, in a single sentence it gave the executive 
branch the power to withhold funds when program beneficiaries had been 
"discriminated against on the ground of race,"149 a power applicable to all 
gress itself saw great ambiguity in the word "discrimination." See notes 170-91 infta and accompanying 
text (relying on legislative history to show congressional uncertainty regarding definition). 
143. See 438 U.S. at 284-87 (opinion of Powell, J.) (quoting from statements of members of Con-
gress); id. at 328-40 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.) (same); id. at 413-16 (opin· 
ion of Stevens, J., with Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.) (same). 
144. See Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 119, 155 (1965) (criticiz-
ing Supreme Court's reliance on "dubious" legal history). 
145. E. REDMAN, THE DANCE OF LEGISLATION 10 (1973) (quoting WoODROW WILSON, CONORES· 
SIONAL GOVERNMENT 297 (1913)). 
146. See House Suhcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 649-60 (quoting text of H.R. 7152). 
147. Jd. at 2349 (statement of Rep. Celler) (acknowledging H.R 7152 as basis for subcommittee's 
efforts). Actually, 168 bills and four joint resolutions, many fairly repetitious, had been introduced in 
the House and were before the subcommittee. I d. at iii-iv (table of contents). Meanwhile, the Senate's 
efforts on a civil rights bill focused on a public accommodations law, and hearings on the Senate side 
were restricted to that topic. See generally Senate Hearings, supra note 43 (record of hearings). 
148. See House Suhcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 659 (text of title VI ofH.R. 7152). The origi· 
nal text provided: 
I d. 
Sec. 601. Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary in any law of the United States 
providing or authorizing direct or indirect financial assistance for or in connection with any 
program or activity by way of grant, contract, loan, insurance, guaranty, or otherwise, no such 
law shall be interpreted as requiring that such financial assistance shall be furnished in cir· 
cumstances under which individuals participating in or benefiting from the program or activ-
ity are discriminated against on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin or are 
denied participation or benefits therein on the ground of race, color, religion, or national 
origin. All contracts made in connection with any such program or activity shall contain such 
conditions as the President may prescribe for the purpose of assuring that there shall be no 
discrimination in employment by any contractor or subcontractor on the ground of race, 
color, religion, or national origin. 
149. Jd. 
I 
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federal programs and contracts.150 Second, the drafters of title VI intended it 
to provide the source of Congress' power under article I of the Constitution to 
reach private discrimination in employment, 151 and in a second sentence, 
therefore, they gave the President power to prescribe federal contract provi-
sions that would outlaw employment discrimination by federal contractors, a 
goal to be pursued by a presidentially appointed Commission on Equal Em- . 
ployment Opportunity established under title VIJ.I52 
The procedural confusion that surrounded progress of the bill makes ii diffi-
cult to find a specific statement of reasons why Congress altered this first ver-
sion of title VI and what it hoped the changes would accomplish. Only one set 
of fact-finding hearings on the bill took place, 153 and the House committee 
adopted a substantially revised substitute after a brief but revealing executive 
sessiOn with the Attorney General154 and after the powerful committee chair-
man had stifled debate.ISS The Senate held no hearings and indeed did not 
consider the bill at all in committee, but only in an informal caucus among the 
bipartisan leadership.156 The Senate made few changes in title VI, I 57 however, 
and the House hearing record and Judiciary Coinmittee report, therefore, com-
prise the most authoritative source's reflecting the concerns that led to the final 
version of title VI. 
150. Id Previous executive orders forbidding racial discrimination by federal contractors had oper-
ated upon the same spending power rationale. See Exec. Order No. 11,063, 27 C.F.R. 11,527, reprinted 
in [1962] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws 4386, 4386-89 (Kennedy order prohibiting discrimination in 
housing industry). There was concern, however, that the President alone lacked constitutional authority 
to attach congressionally unapproved conditions to federal contracts, cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (presidential power to act without congressional authorization limited), 
and title VI, together with the proposed title VII, was designed to supplement with specific statutory 
authority the President's argument of inherent authority to set terms of contracts. See HotiSe Subcomm. 
Hearings. supra note 43, at 1023-24 (oral testimony of Robert Sauer, Assistant Gen. Counsel, Housing 
and Home Finance Agency). 
151. See HotiSe Suhcomm. Hearings. supra note 43, at 1489-92 (statement of Secretary of Labor 
Wirtz) (discussing problem of minority unemployment and hope that titles VI and VII would eliminate 
discrimination causing it). 
152. See note 148 supra (text of title VI of H.R. 7152). Such a limited equal employment enforce-
ment program had operated without explicit legislative sanction for two decades prior to 1964. See 
Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. § 957 (1938-1943 Compilation) (1941 Presidential order under war 
powers prohibiting discrimination in defense production industry). 
153. See HotiSe Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43 (comprising 2649 pages of transcribed material, 
including presentations from 101 witnesses and correspondents); HousE JuDICIARY REPORT, supra 
note 48, at 44, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 2413 (additional views of Rep. 
Meader) (summarizing subcommittee action). 
154. See HotiSe Comm. Hearings, supra note 51, at 2651, 2653-60 (testimony of Attorney General 
Kennedy) (seeking revisions in other titles of bill but demonstrating satisfaction with subcOmmittee's 
version of title VI). 
, 155. See note 178 in.fra and accompanying text (discussing Chairman Celler's attempts to close 
discussion). 
156. The Senate leaders persuaded their colleagues to make substantial changes in other portions of 
the act, but not in title VI. See BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS OPERATIONS MANUAL, THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS Acr OF 1964, at 289, 298 (1964) (explaining Senator Humphrey's position that Senate made no 
substantive changes in title VI). The Senate held hearings only on public accommodations. See Senate 
Hearings, supra note 43,passim (record of hearings). 
157. See notes 219-21 in.fra and accompanying text (explaining minor Senate changes). 
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B. THE DRAFTING OF TITLE VI-THE NEED TO COMPROMISE 
1. Criticism of H.R. 7152 at the House Hearings 
Criticism of title VI of H.R. 7152 focused on four perceived problems: (1) 
discretionary enforcement power placed in the executive; (2) the scope of sanc-
tions in relation to the extent of discrimination; (3) the denial of judicial re-
view; and ( 4) the vagueness of the term "discrimination." In order to construe 
properly the present version of title VI, it is necessary to understand these criti-
cisms, with the last being especially important. 
.Discretionary E'!forcement. The passive language of the original first 
sentence of title ·VJ158 was designed by the administration to allow it some 
flexibility in enforcement of the provision. President Kennedy had argued in 
his second public address on the bill that inflexible funding termination deci-
sions could close programs needed by blacks as well as whites. 159 Neither con-
servatives nor liberals in the House found that argument very persuasive. 
Liberals, led by Representative (now Senator) Charles Mathias, Jr., voiced 
concern that such discretion would allow presidents to make title VI a dead 
letter, pointing out that the President had waived similar antidiscrimination 
requirements in the past. 16° Conservatives and some moderates, on the other 
hand, feared that discretion would give the President "a free hand to grant or 
withhold funds when and where he pleases."161 He could use that power for 
political ends, I62 either to punish southern states•63 or to gain control of mat-
ters historically reserved to the states. 164 
Scope of Sanctions. Both liberals and conservatives criticized the origi-
nal version ofH.R. 7152 because they believed it could either authorize state-
wide termination of funds when only one locality had discriminated or a com-
158. For the original text of title VI, see note 148 supra ("no such law shall be interpreted as requir· 
ing" financial assistance to discriminatory programs). 
159. See President's Special Message to Congress on Civil Rights and Job Opportunities, June 19, 
1963, 1963 Pus. PAPERS 483, 492, reprinted in House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1454 (un· 
conditional withdrawal of all federal funds may penalize those who least deserve it without ending 
discrimination); House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1465 (testimony of Secretary Wirtz) (in· 
terpreting provision to give "discretionary authority" to administrators). 
160. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 956-60, 971, 1133 (remarks of Re{l. Mathias) 
(discussing government's failure to terminate contract for power plant on federal land despite contrac· 
tor's violation of equal employment provisions). 
161. /d. at 1715 (testimony of Rep. Watson of South Carolina); cf. id. at 1723 (testimony of Rep. 
Seldin of Alabama) (expressing concern that President may use power for "other purposes" than help· 
ing blacks). 
162. See id. at 1716 (testimony of Rep. Watson) (foreseeing "string-pulling and coercion by the 
administration in their effort to unpose their will on others"); cf. ld. at 1736-37 (testimony of Rep. 
Waggonner of Louisiana) (criticizing bill because "pure equality is communism"). 
163. See id. at 2139 (statement of South Carolina attorney Douglas McKay, Jr.) (characterizing 
power to withhold funds as extension of "government-by-threat"). 
164. See id. at 1522 (remarks of Rep. Meader of Michigan) (title VI may impair vitality of local 
governments); id. at 1596 (testimony of Rep. Dorn of South Carolina) (every state and local govern· 
ment could be coerced and intimidated by President); cf. ld. at 1733 (testimony of Rep. Waggonner) 
(bill will rele~:~n~~te and local government to "ashcan of history"). Chairman Celler answered those 
who feared a · · trative discretion by noting that mandatory eriforcement ''would be very difficult to 
put in a law .... You would have to trust the (federal administrative] officials." /d. at 2233. Mr. 
Celler later compromised See notes 183-206 infra and accompanying text (explaining development of 
compromise position). 
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plete funding denial for an entire program that had ·engaged in only isolated 
and minor acts of discrimination. Even Chairman Emanuel Celler of New 
York, who led the administration's forces, asked of one witness, "What degree 
would the discrimination have to be before you issue that proscription: that no 
Federal funds should be expended in those states? ... Where would all this 
end?"165 Members of both parties recognized that some discrimination existed . 
in every state and that without some limitation on title VI sanctions, any state 
could suffer a complete loss of federal funds because of discrimination by a 
few program officers or political subdivisions.166 
Judicial Review. The lack of a provision for judicial review of funding 
terminations also drew wide criticism. Most vociferous were southern mem-
bers who ''would rather have an explicit provision denying completely such 
funds" 167 than subject themselves to the federal administrators' unreviewable 
discretion: "At least then we would still be under the rule of law and not the 
rule of men .... " 168 Perhaps more important, the Republicans favoring a 
civil rights bill supported an alternative to H.R. 7152 which contained a provi-
sion for judicial review.169 
Definition of Discrimination. The last problem was addressed by two 
members present at the hearings who perceptively remarked that the word 
"discrimination" had no fixed meaning170 and was nowhere defin<?d in title 
VI. 171 Although debaters did not use the modem jargon of "intentional" dis-
crimination versus "impact" discrimination (or discriminatory "effects"), 172 
165. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1095 (remarks of Chairman Celler). 
166. See id at 1512 (remarks of Cliairman Celler) (by implication) (alluding to pockets of discrimi-
nation in several local governments); id at 1504 (remarks of Judiciary Comm. Gen. Counsel Foley) 
(describing desegregation cases in Ohio, Michigan, and New York); cf. id at 1093 (remarks of Rep. 
McCulloch) (one of repeated references to previous problems arising from federal termination of grant 
to Ohio). 
Bills offered by several Republicans would have solved the problem of scope of termination by limit-
ing coverage to employment contracts and allowing the administration to terminate only specific con-
tracts upon proof of discrimination by an employee under that contract. See H.R. 3139, 88th Cong., 1st 
Sess. §211 (1963), reprinted in House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 72-73; H.R. 3144, 88th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 211 (1963), reprinted in House Subcomm. Hearings, supra, at 129-30. 
167. House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1716 (remarks of Rep. Watson of South Carolina). 
168. Id; cf. id at 1735 (testimony of Rep. Waggonner) (civil rights proposals grant sweeping power 
to one appointed individual). 
169. A good indication of this came when Representative McCulloch of Ohio, leader of the Republi-
cans favoring passage of a civil rights bill, phrased his questions to the southern representatives in a 
manner designed to demonstrate the desirability of judicial review. See id at 1583 (question to Rep. 
Dorn of South Carolina) (emphasizing unreviewable termination power of one individual); id at 1716 
(question to Rep. Watson of South Carolina) (same); cf. id at 1547 (remarks while questioning HEW 
Secretary Celebreeze) ("there is need for some review by somebody somewhere"). 
170. See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 106, reprinted in (1964) U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. News at 2473 (minority views of Reps. Poffand Cramer). A similar problem arose under title VII. 
Id at 110-11, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News at 2477-78. The Supreme Court 
resolved the interpretation problem for title VII in 1971. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 
431 (1971) (employment practice that has effect of excluding blacks prohibited unless related to job 
performance). 
171. Title III defined "desegregation," although not "discrimination." See House Subcomm. Hear-
ings, supra note 43, at 654-65 (original text of title III, facilitating desegregation in public education). 
The use in title III of the phrase "racial imbalance," however, tended to exacerbate concern about what 
title VI covered. See note 173 infta (discussing confusion over meaning of racial imbalance). 
172. See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legis-
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several members expressed the same concerns in the catchwords of a different 
decade: "racial imbalance."173 The hearings show that several members were 
concerned that "discrimination" might include mere racial imbalance, 174 espe-
cially since title III of the administration's bill, designed to end discrimination 
in public education, specifically provided for special funding to alleviate the 
problems of "racial imbalance."175 These concerns became fears when Secre-
tary Celebrezze of HEW seemed to imply in testimony that the use in title VI 
of the word "discrimination" would incorporate the "racial imbalance" con-
cept of title 111.176 
2. The Celebrezze Testimony on "Discrimination" 
The Celebrezze testimony is the key to understanding the House's resolution 
of the fourth criticism of the original version of title VI. Moreover, the Secre-
tary's testimony explains the way in which the later, substitute version of H.R. 
7152 encompassed a compromise position that met all four criticisms. 
Under detailed cross-examination from Representative Cramer of Florida, 
Secretary Celebrezze seemed to endorse racial balance as a goal of title VI. 177 
As the exchange grew more heated, Chairman Celler cut off further Republi-
can questioning.178 Representative Rodino and Chairman Celler then tried to 
defuse the situation by pointing out that the "racial imbalance" language did 
/alive Motive, 1971 SuP. CT. REv. 95 (one of first two articles, appearing well after passage of 1964 Act, 
expounding intent-impact distinction); Ely, Legislative and Atfminislralive Motivalion in Conslllullonal 
Law, 19 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970) (same). 
173. Although Rep. Cramer complained that "racial imbalance" lacked a statutory definition, House 
Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1512, he and his colleagues appeared to understand the term 
"racial imbalance" to mean statistically unequal representation of races due to housing patterns or 
other private action, rather than to governmentally imposed segregation. See /d. at 1425 (remarks of 
Rep. Cramer) (summarizing article submitted for record, detailing unbalanced housing patterns); id. at 
1518 (remarks ofReJ>. Meader) (defining racial balance in terms of population statistics); cf. /d. at 1509 
(testimony of HEW Secretary Celebrezze) (residential segregation lias resulted in de facto segregation 
of schools). Because it was unclear whether the term connoted unintentional segregation or legally 
imposed segregation, the Secretary's agreement to study the issue further only heightened some mem-
bers' suspicions. See id. at 1516 (remarks of Rep. Cramer) ("You want us to give you a blank check ••• 
and we don't know what racial imbalance is, and you apparently don't know, yourself''). 
174. See id. at 1424 (remarks of Rep. Cramer) (expressing particular concern over new concept of 
discrimination known as racial imbalance); id. at 1580 (remarks of Rep. Meader) (expressing concern 
that "if racial imbalance is discrimination," title VI could bestow unreasonably broad powers). 
175. See id. at 654-55 (quoting text of original title III of H.R. 7152). 
176. See id. at 1514-17 (testimony of HEW Secretary Celebrezze) (discussing title VI power to with-
hold funds in context of racial imbalance). Although Secretary Celebrezze suggested at one point that 
the agency would scrutinize school zoning for racial imbalance only to determine if it were part of a 
"scheme" to maintain segregation, he immediately expanded this statement by opining that "racial 
imbalance in any community comes because of school district lines." /d. at 1514 (emphasis added). The 
imprecision in defining racial imbalance, however, was not as alarming as the Secretary's tymg of 
"racial imbalance" in title III with "discrimination" in title VI. Concern over the latter term dominated 
the remainder of the subcommittee's discussion with Secretary Celebrezze. See /d. at 1516-33 (discuss-
ing implications of broad definition of "discrimination"). 
177. See id. at 1514 (responding that funds could be terminated for schools rejecting federal "assist-
ance" to end imbalance if title VI passed). Representative Cramer inferred from the testimony that the 
Secretary was claiming power to withhold all funds whenever he found racial imbalance./d. at 1518 
(remarks of Rep. Cramer). 
178. See id. at 1517-18 (remarks of Chairman Celler) ("I don't want the hearing prolonged wiili 
unduly redundant questions"). 
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not appear in title VI itself, 179 but under questioning by Representative 
Meader, Secretary Celebrezze again took the position that if HEW determined 
after study that racial imbalance in a particular school system caused the same 
problems as traditional segregation, then "steps will have to be taken under 
title Vl."180 The Secretary's statement followed an admission to Representa-
tive Cramer that "no court decision" had outlawed racial imbalance, 181 and· 
made clear his view that any action against such imbalance under title VI 
would arise from an executive, not a judicial, determination of what consti-
tutes discrimination in any specific locality.1B2 
The Secretary's inability to clarify this critical issue for the Republican 
members, at a time when Chairman Celler was trying to build broad biparti-
san support for the Act, 183 led even the chairman to suggest that "[s]ome crite-
ria might be added to this bill that would . . . help you in your determination 
as to whether or not there was discrimination, or whether or not racial imbal-
ance is the discrimination referred to in title Vl."184 When Representative 
Meader revived the issue, 185 the chairman again explicitly demanded that the 
Secretary submit "some sort of guidelines under which you would have to op-
erate with reference to title Vl."186 
The brouhaha that led Chairman Celler to request that HEW suggest guide-
lines for construing title VI provided the ranking minority member, Represen-
tative McCulloch, an opportunity to argue once again for the Republicans' pet 
provision-judicial review of title VI sanctions.187 The chairman; however, 
presented the case against judicial review.1_88 Recalling a· number of instances 
in which federal judges had taken two to seven years to decide desegregation 
cases, Celler argued that "we would have to wait until doom's day before you 
[the agency] can implement your decision."189 The Secretary's agreement with 
the chairman 190 manifested the administration's intent that title VI serve as a 
vehicle not for judicial action, but rather for congressional, executive, and 
agency action-and controJ.l91 
179. See id at 1518 (remarks of Rep. Rodino) ("racial imbalance only appears in the title III"); id at 
1519 (remarks of Chairman Celler) (no provision in title VI allows cutoff of funds for racial imbalance). 
180. Id at 1519 (remarks of Secretary Celebrezze). 
181. Id at 1517. 
182. See id at 1514-17 (HEW investigation revealing segregationist scheme behind school zoning 
would justify cutoff of funds). 
183. See id at 908 (opening statement of Chairman Celler) ("I am confident that Congress will meet 
its responsibility and further our program in a nonpartisan and unprejudiced fashion"). 
184. Id at 1521. 
185. See id (noting that his state of Michigan had suffered from federal administrator's decision to 
withhold funding for state programs). · 
186. Id at 1522. 
187. See id at 1524 (remarks of Rep. McCulloch) (urging need for right to appeal "capricious" acts 
of administrators). . 
188. See id at 1523 (remarks of Chairman Celler) (considering need for expeditious action, resort to 
courts would be "very, very wrong"). 
189. Id 
190. See id at 1533 (testimony of Secretary Celebrezze) (expressing complete agreement with chair-
man's statement concerning judicial review). 
191. See id In the Secretary's view, "Congress can call in and question the administrator as to why 
he acted in that way [in terminating funds], and if they find he acted in a malicious manner Congress 
has a right to change the law. That is the check on it." Id 
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At the close of hearings the subcommittee held seventeen days of mark-up in 
executive session,192 in which it altered H.R. 7152 in several substantial re-
spects. Most importantly, the subcommittee decided to split off title VII and to 
extend substantially its coverage from just federally funded employers to all 
employers engaged in interstate commerce. 193 Placing title VII on its own con-
stitutional footing allowed the subcommittee to consider in greater detail the 
wide-ranging impact of title VI, which, with its spending power basis, applied 
to all funding situations, not just employment. Separating out the employment 
provision, of course, left the original version of title VI as a single sentence, 
simply declaring the President's discretionary authority to withhold funds. 194 
This single sentence, compared with the detailed provison that eventually 
emerged from the full committee, 195 shows the exent of compromise reached to 
meet the criticisms of H.R. 7152. A successful compromise would have had to 
accomplish four major objectives: to make nearly mandatory the executive's 
enforcement obligation while retaining some flexibility, as the Attorney Gen-
eral and Chairman Celler demanded; to limit the scope of any sanction so that 
minor or localized acts of discrimination would not result in a cutoff of all 
funds for a state; to provide for judicial review of sanctions while not robbing 
· administrators of their ability to act quickly; and to reconcile seemingly irrec-
oncilable views concerning whether title VI should reach only de jure discrimi-
nation or de facto discrimination as well. The subcommittee compromise 
contained each of these necessary ingredients.l96 
The key to the compromise was the decision to authorize the executive de-
partments and agencies to adopt their own regulations for enforcement of the 
general antidiscrimination clause. 197 This new element allowed the remainder 
of the compromise to fall neatly into place. First, in order to satisfy the liber-
als, the amended version made promulgation of implementing regulations 
mandatory. 198 To accommodate the conservatives, however, the compromise 
192. HousE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 44, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CoDE CoNo. & AD. 
NEWS at 2413 (additional views of Rep. Meader). , 
193. See id at 66, reprinted in [1964) U.S. CODE CoNo. & AD. NEWS at 2434 (minority report) (under 
title VII EEOC should have power over businesses affecting commerce). 
194. See note 148 supra (quoting original text of title VI). 
195. The bill that emerged from the subcommittee moved from the full committee to the house floor 
with only two changes: deletion of an explicit provision for enforcement via injunction, and deletion of 
coverage of insurance contracts. See HousE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 85-86, reprinted in 
[1964) U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 2454 (minority report) (discussing deletions). 
196. HousE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 85-86, reprinted in [1964) U.S. CoDE CoNo. & AD. 
NEWS at 2453-55 (minority report) (comparing reported bill with subcommittee proposal). 
The compromise language apparently was drafted by the Department of Justice and accepted by the 
subcommittee. See House Comm. Hearings, supra note 51, at 2703 (remarks of Rep. Brooks) (compro-
mise language authorized by Attorney General's office and considered by committee). Although la-
beled "title VII" in this draft, it would regain its original title number upon passage. To avoid 
confusion, reference to the provision throughout this discussion will be to title VI. 
197. See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 85, reprinted in [1964) U.S. CODE CONO. & 
AD. NEws at 2454 (minority report) (quoting text of provision granting enforcement authority); House 
Suhcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 2703 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy) (agencies will 
issue rules and regulations prior to cutoff to afford recipient opportunity to comply). 
198. House Comm. Hearings, supra note 51, at 2732 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy). 
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also required that the regulations be "consistent with the achievement of the 
objectives" of the various underlying federal grant programs.199 Moreover, the 
amended version provided the executive branch flexibility in choosing the 
means of enforcing the regulations and directed it to seek voluntary compli-
ance before initiating formal sanctions.200 Second, these changes also helped to 
satisfy those who sought to limit the scope of the funding termination. As 
Attorney General Kennedy explained, the language requiring that termina-
tions be "consistent with the achievement of the objectives" of the federal pro-
gram would ensure that isolated acts of discrimination would not prompt an 
agency to subvert an entire congressionally authorized program.201 The lan-
guage of the termination provision, limiting termination to "such discrimina-
tory programs,"202 would ensure that any cutoff would be limited to a 
particular program, and would not be of statewide scope. 203 
Finally, the decision to adopt a general statutory principle to be supple-
mented with specific regulations facilitated a compromise on the issue of judi-
cial review.204 The subcommittee compromise envisioned a limited judicial 
role: it did not require an agency to go to court to enforce its decision, but 
permitted an aggrieved party to seek judicial review of the agency's action. 205 
Most important in preserving the agency's power, and in preventing unwar-
ranted delay through de novo judicial factfinding, this form of administrative 
review allowed the agency's determination the benefit of the deferential "sub-
stantial evidence" test prevailing under the Administrative Procedure Act.206 
2. Regulatory Definition of "Discrimination" 
The delegation of regulatory authority not only catalyzed compromise on 
other issues, it also quieted some of the controversy concerning the final criti-
cism of the bill, the lack of a definition of discrimination. Under intense ques-
tioning by Representative Mathias, Attorney General Kennedy pointedly 
explained that the feared "breadth of delegation of rulemaking authority"2 07 
199. See id at 2740-41 (discrimination against one individual would not cause cutoff to entire pro-
gram); cf. id at 2740 (remarks of Rep. Willis) (funding termination can undercut federal program goals 
by denying benefits to those who need them). 
200. See id at 2740 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy) (agency should seek amicable solution 
before resorting to cutoff of funding). 
201. See note 199 supra (statement by Attorney General Kennedy); cf. House Comm. Hearings, supra 
note 51, at 2739 (remarks of Rep. Ashmore) (expressing fear that innocent people would be harmed by 
termination based on discrimination against one person); House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 
1890 (remarks of Chairman Celler) (same). 
202. HousE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 85, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. 
NEWS at 2454 (minority report). 
203. See House Comm. Hearings, supra note 51, at 2766 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy) 
(regulations adopted for each grant program would provide procedure for funding review for that pro-
gr~.a~::~d at 2703 (''there is judicial review, which we didn't provide for in the original measure"); 
id at 2740 (each program has right to judicial review of agency finding of violation). 
205. See id. at 2732 (remarks of Rep. Cramer) (discussing right to court determination when funds 
withheld). 
206. See 5 U.S. C. § 706 (1976) (providing standard of review under "substantial evidence" test); cf. 
House Comm. Hearings, supra note 5 I, at 2732 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy) (acknowledg-
ing that under judicial review court would apply "substantial evidence" test, not "preponderance of 
evidence" test). 
207. House Comm. Hearings, supra note 51, at 2765 (remarks of Rep. Mathias). 
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was necessary because "there are so many different programs" and "to try to 
write out something specifically in legislation as to what should be done, and 
what rules and regulations would be issued is virtually impossible."20B As if 
responding to Chairman Celler's original criticism that title VI lacked stan-
dards defining discrimination, Kennedy pointed out that the "particular [fed-
eral] program, with that [antidiscrimination principle of section 601] as a 
general criterion to follow, will establish the rules that will be followed in the 
administration of the program-so that the recipients of the program will un-
derstand what they can or cannot do."209 
The compromise on the definition of discrimination constituted a decision to 
confer on another body-the executive agencies-the final power to determine 
the meaning of the word. Although the subcommittee at the same time struck 
out the references to "racial imbalance" in title III,210 the committee members 
were quite aware that elimination of that phrase from title III provided no 
clarification of the meaning of title VI. The Minority Report on the bill char-
acterized the delegation to the agencies as "a matter of 'public relations,' "211 
and accurately predicted that the administration would "rely upon its own 
construction of 'discrimination' as including the lack of racial balance,"212 as 
agencies had done in regulations enforcing previous antidiscrimination legisla-
tion. 2 13 The majority did not take issue with that interpretation of the 
compromise.214 
208. Id at 2765-66 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy). 
209. Id at 2740 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy). The following colloquy, in which the 
Attorney General outlined the changes made in the original version of title VI, shows the importance of 
the regulation-making authority in reaching a bipartisan compromise on the title: 
Id 
Attorney General Kennedy .... I think first the fact you have judicial review-and the 
second-the strong point is that the fact that the rules and regulations dealing with the prob-
lem are set out so that everybody understands it. Everybody understands what regulations 
they have to meet, what rufes they have to follow, if they are going to receive the aid and 
assistance. 
Mr. Ashmore. Rules and regulations are the things I am opposed to. 
Attorney General Kennedy. I understand, Congressman, but it is set forth now. And that I 
think is better than originally. 
Mr. Ashmore. What are the conditions now since it has been modified? 
Attorney General Kennedy. What it sets forth is that basically there will not be discrimina-
tion in the expenditures of any funds, there will not be discrimination against any individual 
based on his color or his country of origin. The particular program, with that as a general 
criterion to follow, will establish the rules that will be followed in the administration of the 
program-so that the recipients of the program will understand what they can or cannot do. 
Then if there is a problem, if they feel that-if there is a breakdown and there is an allegation 
that they have violated the rules, then there can be judicial review. So I think that is an 
advantage of the program-although there is still strong criticism about it. 
210. See House JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 81-84, reprinted In (1964) U.S. CoDE CONO. & 
AD. News at 2450-52 (minority report) (discussing text oftitle III reported out by subcommittee, omit-
ting reference to racial imbalance). 
211. Id at 67, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CoDE CoNo. & AD. News at 2436. 
212. Id at 68, reprinted in [1964] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. News at 2436. 
213. See id (citing broad language in standards proposed in 1963 by Secretary of Labor concerning 
union apprenticeship programs). 
214. The silence of the committee report on the issue of interpreting discrimination is not surprising 
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3. Fine Tuning and Passage 
The version of title VI that emerged from the subcommittee, which the full 
committee altered only slightly,215 contained all ofthe essential elements that 
the full Congress later adopted and that President Johnson signed into law.216 
The few amendments that Congress accepted tended to strengthen and confirm 
the compromise rather than alter it. Representative Lindsay's one-sentence 
amendment on the House floor, for example, required that all regulations 
promulgated under title VI be approved by the President,2I7 thereby ensuring 
that, on the "important" and volatile issue of discrimination, the highest polit-
ical sensitivity would serve to control bureaucratic discretion in rulemaking.218 
Thus, the amendment tended to ameliorate the one shortcoming of the bill-
that administrative discretion could go unchecked. Another provision in the 
final House version required notice to the House and Senate committees re-
sponsible for the particular programs before funds could be withheld.219 This 
addition reinforced the thrust of the Lindsay amendment, further demonstrat-
ing Congress' belief that the legislators ultimately ought to determine for 
themselves whether sanctions should, as a political matter, be enforced against 
certain grantees. Similarly; a Senate-initiated amendment implicitly ratifYing 
one element of the compromise made absolutely clear the provision that an 
agency could terminate funds only to a program in which discrimination was 
found.220 Senator Humphrey summarized the work of the Senate by declaring, 
"We have made no changes of substance in title VI . . . ."221 
in light of Chairman Celler's attempt to cool tempers and minimize the issue during the Celebreeze 
testimony before the subcommittee. See text accompanying notes 118-84supra (discussing Celebreeze 
testimony). In the subcommittee hearings Joseph Rauh, testifying in favor of passage of the bill, felt the 
stem hand of the chairman who did not want to let Rauh reopen the issue of racial imbalance: "I 
think," said Rep. Celler, interrupting Rauh, ''you ought to give that a little more time before you 
present an opinion on that, because there are lots to be said on both sides." "I was going to be careful," 
replied Rauh, sheepishly. HoliSe Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1889. In light of the Chairman's 
stated view that he preferred "to give the widest kind of discretion" to administrators in dealing with 
the "wholesale variety of cases,"id. at 1890, the provision in the revised bill for formalized rulemaking 
represented a workable compromise, obviating any need to mention racial imbalance. Cf. id. at 1521 
(remarks of Chairman Celler) (bill should contain standards consistent with need for flexibility to gov-
ern agency action). 
215. See HOUSE JUDICIARY REPORT, supra note 48, at 85-86, reprinted in (1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & 
AD. NEWS at 2453-55 (minority report) (comparing reported bill with subcommittee proposal). 
216. Title VI, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000d (1976)). 
217. See 110 CoNG. REc. 2499 (1964) (quoting Lindsay amendment). 
218. See id. (remarks of Rep. Lindsay) ("latitude" of regulatory power creates need for presidential 
approval). Representative Lindsay's constituents_ in New York were among those who could have been 
most affected by an administrator's decision to adopt "racial imbalance" as the test for discrimination 
under title VI. See HoliSe Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1512 (remarks of Chairman Celler of 
New York City) (discussing serious racial imbalance in New York). 
219. See 110 CONG. REc. 16,001 (1964) (comparing House version to Senate version of title VI). 
220. See id. at 14,219-20 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Holland) (listing changes made to House version). 
The Senate, however, made substantial changes in parts of the 1964 Act other than title VI. Id at 
14,219 (remarks of Sen. Holland). 
221. Id. at 12,714 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Many of the arguments. presented earlier in the 
House subcommittee hearing resurfaced in tlie Senate but resulted in no significant amendments. For 
example, to charges from relative moderates that title VI omitted definitional standards for guiding 
those who would administer the law, id. at 12,320 (remarks of Sen. Byrd of West Virginia), and allowed 
"lesser appointed officials" to determine what constitutes discrimination, id. at 13,130 (remarks of Sen. 
Gore), proponents responded not with denials but with assurances that procedural safeguards would 
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Although Senate proponents of title VI repeatedly invoked constitutional 
principles to support section 601 of the bill,222 they did so under a barrage of 
equally lofty attacks from senators who deemed the bill "clearly unconstitu-
tional."223 The senior chamber heard Senator Byrd of West Virginia raise the 
volatile issue whether section 602 would permit regulations to correct "racial 
imbalance," a fear shared by many southemers.224 He condemned the regula-
tions as tools ''whereby the Federal Government can force whatever sociologi-
cal concepts may strike the fancy of those in power'' upon local grantees.22S 
Instead of precluding the "racial imbalance" test by defining discrimination,226 
however, the Senate dealt narrowly with racial balance only by prohibiting 
school busing orders to achieve it.227 This so-called Javits amendment, no 
more than a minor limitation on the possible scope of the definition of discrim-
ination, reinforces the conclusion that Congress intended to confer wide dis-
cretion on agencies by giving them rulemaking authority.22s 
D. SUBSEQUENT CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS! TITLE VI AND ITS ANALOGUES 
The peculiarly legislative and administrative-rather than constitutional-
reduce the resulting harm. See id at 13,128-30 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoft) (explaining safeguards, in-
cluding limited funds termination and judicial review). 
222. See, e.g., id at 5253 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (discrimination in use of federal funds 
"clearly violative of the Constitution''); id at 13,333 (remarks of Sen. Ribicoft) ("basically, there is a 
constitutional restriction against discrimination in the use of Federal funds"); id (remarks of Sen. 
Morse) (use of federal funds in discriminatory programs "unconstitutional"); id at 13,334 (remarks of 
Sen. Pastore) (same). The senators, however, were not always meticulous in their use of constitutional 
rhetoric; Senator Humphrey, the bill's floor manager, once asserted that title II (private accommoda-
tions) and title VII (private employment) "protect the rights already guaranteed in the Constitution," 
id at 5252, a demonstrably false assertion. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883) (fourteenth 
amendment does not reach private discrimination). These Senators, by invoking constitutional princi-
ple, may have been thinking of their Article 1-type constitutional power to legislate on these issues. See 
110 CoNG. REc. 5252 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (discussing authority of Congress). 
Senate proponents, in any event, knew that in some ;:espects title VI might cover fewer areas than 
would the Constitution. See id at 5255 (Case-Humphrey colloquy demonstrating that exclusion of 
insurance contracts in§ 602 would, in effect, limit scope of§ 601). The narrow question of whether the 
Senators intended section 601 to be absolutely coterminous with the Constitution, therefore, cannot be 
answered affirmatively. 
223. 110 CoNG. REc. 13,383 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); see id at 5233 (remarks of Sen. Long) 
("no business passing this unconstituti.onallaw"); if. id at 13,416 (remarks of Sen. Talmadge) (title 
would create veritable "dictatorship''); id at 13,417 (remarks of Sen. Stennis) (same). 
The constitutional rhetoric of both proponents and opponents reached its height during the limited 
period of heated debate following invocation of cloture. See generally id at 13,327-418 (post-cloture 
debate). 
224. See notes 173-74 supra (House subcommittee discussions on racial imbalance). 
225. 110 CoNG. REc. 12,321 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Byrd). 
226. The Senate rejected an amendment by Senator Long that would have defined the term in an-
other title of the Act See id at 12,320 (Amendment No. 764 to title II) (discrimination means "any 
arbitrary and unreasonable differentiation in the treatment regularly and habitually accorded" to 
groups covered by title). 
227. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. IV, 78 Stat. 248-49 (1964) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000c-6(a) (1976));see 
110 CoNG. REc. 12,717 (remarks of Sen. Javits) (assuring Sen. Byrd that "there is no case" in which 
statute would require federal funds be "directed toward restoring or bringing about a racial balance in 
the schools"). 
228. Cf. Drummond v. Acree, 409 U.S. 1228 (Powell, Circuit Justice, 1972). Justice Powell refused a 
stay, id at 1231, under a statute that required postponement of busing orders made to achieve racial 
balance. Id at 1229. He reasoned that the lower court's order was designed to achieve not racial bal-
ance, but desegregation. Id at 1231. ''If Congress had desired ••. [a wider result] it could have used 
clear and explicit language appropriate to that result." Id at 1229. 
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approach that Congress brought to bear on title VI in 1964 resurfaced in later 
congressional attempts to deal with civil rights through use of the spending 
power. A number of amendments to title VI failed to change the 1964 compro-
mise,229 and, more importantly, a series of new pieces of legislation accentu-
ated Congress' acceptance of, and reliance on, that compromise. 230 
1. Subsequent Amendments to Title VI 
Congress has amended the 1964 version of title VI on three occasions. Each 
arose in connection with education aid statutes, not in the course of direct and 
substantial review of title VI itself. The first two amendments, passed in 
1966231 and 1968,232 manifested congressional concern with HEW's first seri-
ous enforcement efforts. The department had begun to defer new funding re-
quests of grantees thought to be engaged in discrimination, rather than 
terminating existing funding233 as had been originally contemplated. 234 The 
1966 amendment limited the period that the agency could defer requests with-
out holding a hearing and making express findings of discrimination. 235 The 
1968 amendment arose amid fears that HEW might move more diligently than 
the courts in providing remedies for southern school segregation; Congress re-
sponded narrowly by providing that compliance with an outstanding court de-
cree would constitute compliance with title VI.236 Significantly, the 
amendment said nothing about schools not under court decree and did not 
even apply to those aspects of a system not covered by a decree.237 Moreover, 
even for schools under court order, the amendment made no practical differ-
ence because circuit courts had already ruled that HEW's guidelines were only 
minimum standards.238 Court decrees, therefore, tended to be stricter than 
HEW's standards, and not laxer, as the amendment's sponsors 
contemplated. 239 
229. Compare Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit VI, 78 Stat. 252 (1964) (original compromise as enacted) with 
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976) (current version, incorporating amendments concerning fund deferral, com-
pliance with federal court orders, and uniform application of dese&regation guidelines). 
230. See notes 254-67 i'!fra and accompanying text (discussing title VI anaiogues). 
231. Pub. L. No. 89-750, tit. I,§ 182, 80 Stat. 1209 (1966) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5 (Supp. III 
1979)) (education funding act). 
232. Pub. L. No. 90-247, tit. I, § 112, 81 Stat. 787 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5 (Supp. III 
1979)) (proviso clause) (education funding act). 
233. 112 CoNG. REc. 25,573-74 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Fountain of North Carolina, author of 
amendment); id at 25,574-75 (remarks of Rep. Abbitt of Virginia). 
234. See 110 CoNG. REc. 13,128-30 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Ribicoft) (explaining enforcement steps 
originally contemplated under title VI). 
235. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-5 (Supp. III 1979). 
236. Id (proviso clause). 
237. S. REP. No. 726, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 13, reprinted in (1967] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 
2730, 2743; CoNF. REP. No. 1049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 46, reprinted in [1967] U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. 
NEWS 2814, 2817. . . 
238. See Singleton II, 355 F.2d. at 869 (guidelines only minimum standards of general application); 
notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text (explaining courts' interpretation of guidelines). 
239. A disturbing historical anomaly can oe seen in the early days after passage of the 1964 Act. 
Debates in the House on the 1966 amendment to the Act disclosed that the members of the originating 
committee, the Committee on Education and Labor, then understood that title VI forbade only inten-
tional racial discrimination, not "de facto racial imbalance as such." 112 CoNG. REc. 25,551 (1966) 
(remarks of Rep. Goodell); see id at 25,549-54 (remarks of Reps. O'Hara & Waggonner) (title VI does 
not bar de facto racial imbalance). Because the 1964 compromise had originated in a different commit-
tee, the Judiciary Committee, it is not surprising that representatives on the substantive education com-
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The Stennis Amendment240 is more difficult to interpret. It was added in 
1970 after the Supreme Court, in Green v. County School Board,241 apparently 
adopted an effects test for proving continuing equal protection violations in 
formerly de jure systems.242 Pressed originally by southerners in Congress who 
thought that courts were attacking de facto discrimination in the South while 
leaving it untouched in the North,243 the proposal sought to ensure one nation-
wide desegregation policy without specifying what that policy should be.244 
The opponents suspected that the bill was only a ploy to undermine continuing 
desegregation efforts in the South.245 This was a reasonable suspicion in light 
of both the sponsors' thinly veiled expectations that northern politicians would 
never permit a policy of attacking de facto discrimination, as well as the 
southerners' assertions that de jure discrimination had already been eliminated 
mittee did not fully understand the scope of title VI. These representatives did not in 1966 offer an 
amendment incorporating their views directly into title VI, leaving unresolved the question whether the 
full Congress would have adopted their position. 
The actual provision enacted, the O'Hara Amendment, insofar as it related to HEW's use of an 
effects test, prevented federal officials only from using their grant powers to require transportation to 
cure "racial imbalance." Pub. L. No. 89-750, § 181, 80 Stat. 1209 (1966) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1232a 
(1976)) (now covering all educational aid programs). The legislation was precipitated by congressional 
concern that HEW officials were using title VI authority to intrude into local educational decisionmak-
ing. E.g., 112 CONG. REC. 25,549, 25,550-51 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Waggonner); id. (remarks of Rep. 
Powell); id. at 25,554 (remarks of Rep. Anderson). Another amendment, the Fino Amendment, explic-
itly would have forbidden HEW from reimbursing local districts for expenses incurred directly or indi-
rectly in transr.;rting pupils to achieve racial balance. I d. at 25,553; see id. at 25,554 (remarks of Rep. 
Anderson) (0 Hara Amendment would allow HEW to indirectly require busing by ordering rezoning; 
Fino Amendment would not). But see id. at 25,551 (remarks of Rep. O'Hara) (HEW may not condition 
grants on eliminating racial imbalance). The more specific Fino amendment failed. Id. at 25,555. 
Courts interpreting the amended statute have avoided a resolution of the issue by resorting to a 
constitutional basis for decision. See Dandridge v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 456 F.2d. 552, 554-55 
(5th Cir. 1972) (upholding court-ordered busing plan under fourteenth amendment; rejecting argument 
that§ 1232a forbids such busing); if. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-18 
(1971) (title IV of Civil Rights Act does not withdraw from courts "historic equitable remedial pow-
ers"). The adoption in 191'0 of the Stennis Amendment, Pub. L. No. 91-230, !:j 2, 84 Stat. 121 (1970) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6 (1976)), rendered the 1966 debate somewhat insignificant by contem-
plating, although not specifically authorizing, application of an effects test. See I d. (title VI requires that 
"such other policy as may be provided pursuant to law [be] applied uniformly to de facto segregation 
wherever fonnd"). 
240. Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 2, 84 Stat. 121 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6 (1976)). 
241. 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
242. See id. at 439-42 (quoting with approval Jud_ge Sobeloffs results-conscious language in Bow-
man v. County School Bd., 382 F.2d 326, 333 (4th Crr. 1967) (Sobeloff, J., concurring)). See generally 
The Supreme Court. 1967 Term, 82 HARV. L. REv. 63, 111-18 (1968) (discussing Green and freedom-of-
choice plans). 
243. See 116 CoNG. REc. 1267 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Stennis) (discussing motivation behind 
amendment). 
244. See id. at 1266 (remarks of Sen. Stennis). The original amendment provided that: 
I d. 
It is the policy of the United States that &uidelines and criteria established pursuant to title VI 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and sectiOn 182 of the Elementary and Secondary Education 
Amendments of 1966 shall be applied uniformly in all regions of the United States in dealing 
with conditions of segregation by race in the schools of the local educational agencies of any 
State without regard to origin or cause of such segregation. 
· 245. See, e.g., id. at 2744-45 (remarks of Sen. Pastore) (voicing objection to amendment if it would be 
used to continue segregation); id. at 2935-36 (remarks of Sen. Hatfield) (voicing fear that under amend-
ment there would be no enforcement of Civil Rights Act); iri. at 2935 (remarks of Sen. Case) (disagree-
ing with contention that segregation in North justifies diminution of pressure for desegregation in 
South). 
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in their region.246 
The House-Senate conference, however, so altered the scope of the bill that 
its sponsors thereafter repudiated it. The major offending provision defined 
"uniformity" as one desegregation policy applied uniformly nationwide to de 
jure segregation, and another policy "as may be provided pursuant to law" 
applied uniformly to de facto segregation.247 Because this preserved the very 
de facto-de jure distinction that southerners believed harmed them and pro-
tected the North and West, southerners objected.248 They lost,249 and there-
vised Stennis Amendment, disowned by its father, became law. 
It would be supportive to argue that the Stennis Amendment, like the 1966 
and 1968 amendments, ratified the 1964 compromise by adopting an adminis-
trative solution to defining discrimination. Yet, the best interpretation of these 
amendments is more complex. During the consideration of each bill several 
speakers expressed the view that title VI outlawed only intentional discrimina-
tiOn,250 showing neither appreciation of the 1964 compromise nor familiarity 
with HEW's regulations, which had adopted an effects test.251 This is not sur-
prising, because these amendments did not come from the Judiciary Commit-
tee, which had originally drafted title VI.252 Moreover, all regulatory 
enforcement had taken place in southern schools that had been segregated 
under admittedly de jure systems. The Congressional utterances from 1966 
through 1970 were more statements of what HEW had done rather than what 
it, under authority of title VI, might yet do. 
Whatever some in Congress might have wanted to do, they in actuality ac-
complished little. The 1966 and 1968 amendments changed no part of the 
1964 compromise, and the Stennis Amendment was seen by all in 1970 as more 
hot air than legislation, its author admitting that he offered it 'Just as a state-
ment of policy, hoping it will have influence on HEW in applying these guide-
lines."253 Although Congress has never explicitly reaffirmed its 1964 decision, 
it has not mustered a majority to reverse the initial decision to defer to agency 
authority in defining discrimination. Obfuscation, sometimes calculated, has 
preserved the status quo. 
246. See id. at 2550 (remarks of Sen. Stennis) (agreeing with Sen. Ervin that "what is sauce for the 
New York gander is not sauce for the southern goose"). See also id. at 2546-65 (remarks of Sen. 
Stennis and other supporters of an anti-busing amendment) (identifying extensive segregation in the 
North). 
247. /d. at 10,005. Compare note 244 supra (quoting text of original Stennis amendment) with 42 
U.S.C. § 2000d-6 (1976) (revised Stennis amendment). The revised amendment added that "[s]uch 
uniformity refers to one policy applied uniformly to de jure segregation wherever found and such other 
policy as may be provided pursuant to law applied uniformly to de facto segregation wherever found." 
42 u.s.c. § 2000d-6(b) (1976). 
248. See 116 CONG. REc. 10,000 (remarks of Sen. Stennis) (criticizing conference action); id. at 
10,006 (remarks of Sen. Talmadge) (same); id. at 10,014 (remarks of Sen. Cooper) (same). On the other 
hand, those legislators suspicious of _Senator Stennis' intentions argued that the conference report was 
true to the Senate's initial demand for uniformity in application of law: separate policies regarding de 
facto and de jure discrimination would apply uniformly nationwide. See id. at 10,009 (remarks of 
Senator Javits) (suiJporting conference report). 
249. 116 CoNG. REc. 10,020 (recorded" vote on motion to recommit conference report). 
250. See note 239 supra (discussing House debate on amendments). 
251. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (Supp.l966) (prohibiting recipients from using criteria that have "the 
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination"). 
252. See note 239 supra. 
253. 116 CoNG. REc. 1001 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Stennis). 
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2. Title VI Analogues 
More illuminating than subsequent congressional action on title VI itself has 
been Congress' penchant for using that title as a model for other legislation 
passed under the spending power. These subsequent bills were passed to pro-
tect beneficiaries of federally funded programs from other types of discrimina-
tion, specifically that based on sex,254 handicap,255 and age.2S6 In each of these 
new statutes Congress again used the word "discrimination," and in each in-
stance it became increasingly apparent that Congress intended to allow the 
meaning to vary from the judicial interpretation of the equal protection clause 
by having agency administrators promulgate definitive regulations. 
The first provision emulating title VI, title IX of the Higher Education 
Amendments of 1972,257 contains a virtually verbatim adoption of the 1964 
compromise elements: funding termination limited to particular programs, 
presidential review, notice to Congress, and agency power to promulgate regu-
lations.258 Enacted after seven years of experience with HEW's regulations and 
guidelines, however, and in an area in which there was probably even less 
254. See Education Amendment ofl972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX,§ 901, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 
20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976)) (prohibiting sex: discrimination in certain education programs). 
255. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit. V, § 504, 87 Stat. 393 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979)). 
256. See Age Discrimination Act ofl975, Pub. L. No. 94-135, tit. III,§ 303, 89 Stat. 728 (codified at 
42 u.s.c. § 6102 (1976)). 
257. 20 u.s.c. §§ 1681, 1682 (1976). 
258. Id Title IX provides, in part: 
(a) Prohibition against discrimination; exceptions. 
No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex:, be excluded from participation in, 
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 
Id § 1681 (exceptions omitted). It provides, further: 
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial 
assistance to any education program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a 
contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of 
section 1681 of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, 
or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives 
of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken. 
No such rule, regulation, or order shall become effective unless and until approved by the 
President. Compliance with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be effected 
(l) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to contmue assistance under such program or 
activity to any recipient as to whom there has been an express finding on the record, after 
opportunity for hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such termination or 
refusal shall be limited, to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or other recipient as 
to whom such a finding has been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular 
program, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2) by any other 
means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no such action shall be taken until the 
department or agency concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure 
to comply with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by 
voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating, or refusing to grant or continue, 
assistance because of failure to comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, 
the head of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of the House and 
Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program or activity involved a full written re-
port of the circumstances and the grounds for such action. No such action shall become effec-
tive until thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report. 
Id § 1682. The provision for judicial review also mimics title VI. Compare 20 U.S.C. § 1683 (1976) 
(review provision using title VI language) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1976) (title VI review provision). 
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consensus about the meaning of discrimination,259 the general prohibitory lan-
guage echoing section 601 of title VI was supplemented by numerous excep-
tions.260 Although these exceptions limited the scope of the statute, Congress 
did not preclude use of an effects test.261 Later analogues to title VI follow the 
same general pattern of title IX.262 
The most persuasive indication that Congress did not intend the language of 
title VI, as repeated in the analogues, to adopt the constitutional definition of 
discrimination lies in the subject matter of the analogues. Even before passage 
of the Age Discrimination Act, the Supreme Court held that claims of age 
discrimination arising under the equal protection clause would be subjected 
only to "rational basis" scrutiny,263 scrutiny that has led to the Court's invali-
dation of virtually no state action since the beginning of two-tier analysis in 
the 1960's.264 Yet Congress surely intended that its statute prohibit something 
259. The Supreme Court in 1972 had not agreed upon a J>rotective constitutional standard of review 
for sex classifications, having purported to rely only on the old "rational basis" test when it struck down 
a discriminatory statute. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (statute favoring men over wo-
men as administrators of estates violates equal protection clause because classification not reasonably 
related to object of legislation). In 1973 four members of the Court found sex, like race, a "suspect 
classification" requiring "strict scrutiny." See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973) (plu-
rality opinion) (statute granting automatic benefits to dependents of men but not women in military 
violates due process clause). Three years later a Court majority adopted a less strict, although still 
demanding, level of review. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (gender classifications must 
serve "important governmental objectives" and be "substantially related to those objectives"). The 
contours of the Craig test, however, are far from clear. Compare Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 
384-85 (1979) (S-4 decision) (statute permitting unwed mother but not father to withhold adoption 
consent represents overbroad generalization in gender-based classification and thus violates equal pro-
tection clause) with Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 348-49 (1979) (S-4 decision) (statute permitting 
unwed mother but not father, if mother alive, to sue for wrongful death of child not an overbroad 
generalization violating equal protection clause). See also Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2658 
(1981) (statute requiring only men to register for draft does not violate due process clause because 
women not similarly situated). 
260. See Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX,§ 90l(a), 86 Stat. 373 (1972) (excepting from coverage certain 
religious, military, and traditionally single-sex institutions). The current version of title IX contains 
further exceptions. See 20 U.S.C. § 168l(a)(l)-(9) (1976) (excepting fraternities, beauty pageant schol-
arships, voluntary youth organizations, and others). 
261. Indeed, the language used in section 1618(b), 20 U.S.C. § 168l(b) (1976), closely paralleled 
language in title VII of the 1964 act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1976), which the Supreme Court had 
previously construed to authorize an effects test for defining discrimination. See Griggs v. Duke Power 
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (title VII prohibits employment practices that are-discriminatory in 
operation). 
262. There are some variations. Section 504, which protects handicapped persons, contains none of 
the explicit compromise provisions seen in title VI. See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1979). Congress 
legislated there, however, against the background of a pre-existing statutory scheme of aid to handi-
capped persons, which already embodied single-agency enforcement with wide regulatory authority. 
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (previous aid-to-handicapped scheme). The Age 
Discrimination Act (ADA) manifests an even greater deference to agency expertise, especially that of 
HEW. The ADA authorizes agencies to define "discrimination," 42 U.S.C § 6101 (Supp. III 1979), in 
two stages: first by "general" regulations drafted by HEW after consultation with the Civil Rights 
Commission, id. § 6103(a) (1976), and then by "enforcement" regulations drafted by each affected 
agency which were to be "consistent" with the general regulations. 42 U.S.C. § 6103(a)(4) (Supp. III 
1979). Regarding the scope and use of agency power under the Age Discrimination Act, see Schuck, 
Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27 (1979). 
263. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314, 317 (1976) (per curiam) 
(statute requiring retirement of state police officers at age 50 does not violate rational basis standard). 
264. See generally G. GUNTHER, supra note 8, at 671 (discussing advent of "strict scrutiny" to replace 
rational basis test in certain circumstances). Cases such as Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which 
claimed to impose rational-basis scrutiny, appeared later to h11-ve..been the products of greater scrutiny. 
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring) (Reed showed that Court subjects 
sex classifications to greater scrutiny than ordinarily imposed when suspect classes not involved); Fron-
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more than the lunatic or wholly irrelevant actions outlawed by rational basis 
scrutiny. Similarly, although the Supreme Court has never made explicit the 
level of review applicable to constitutional claims of discrimination against 
handicapped persons,265 and apparently has adopted a fluid, balancing ap-
proach to constitutional claims of sex discrimination, 266 Congress intended its 
title VI analogues in those areas to go beyond minimal constitutional balanc-
ing with stronger rules against discrimination.267 In short, Congress in the 
1970's understood the phraseology and pattern already employed in title VI to 
allow agencies to attack discriminatory actions that do not violate judicial con-
ceptions of constitutional equal protection. 
E. LESSONS FROM THE DRAFTING OF TITLE VI 
The wording and legislative history of title VI point inexorably toward two 
conclusions: (1) Congress did not intend to adopt a discrimination standard 
that would necessarily mimic constitutional equal protection doctrine, and (2) 
Congress intended to give interpretive control over title VI to federal agencies, 
while retaining some supervisory power for itself. 
The compromise that produced title VI showed a peculiarly legislative ap-
proach to defining discrimination, which contradicts the proposition that con-
stitutional equal protection notions alone should provide the standards for title 
VI. In some respects the bill patently differed from the Constitution by offer-
ing less secure safeguards. Most pertinently, the limitation that agency regula-
tions must "be consistent with the objectives" of the underlying federal 
program introduced a political balancing into title VI to prevent broad find-
ings of violation based on isolated acts. Similarly, the Lindsay Amendment 
requirement of presidential approval of regulations also showed that Congress 
wanted executive-political-action to control the discretion inherent in defin-
ing discrimination. In other respects, title VI permitted agency regulations to 
exceed constitutional standards, as shown by Congress' awareness that agen-
cies might define "discrimination" so as to attack de facto discrimination not 
forbidden by judicial construction of the Constitution. 
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973) (plurality opinion) (Reed's "departure from 'traditional' 
rational basis analysis" clearly justified); G. GuNTHER, supra, at 867 n.2 (Reed represents level of 
scrutiny between "rational basis" test and "strict scrutiny"). See generally Gunther, In Search of Evolv-
ing Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Mode/for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972) 
(discussing different levelS of scrutiny). 
265. For a discussion of the issue, see Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The 
Qualifications of Handicapped Persons As A "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 
SANTA CLARA LAW. 855 (1975). 
266. See note 259 supra (describing disposition of sex discrimination cases). 
267. The Supreme Court has never decided the scope of title IX, having dealt only narrowly with the 
right of private beneficiaries to sue under the statute. See Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 
61'7, 717 (1979) (finding implied private right of action under title IX). 
The Rehabilitation Act of 1973, title V, has received Supreme Court attention only once, in South· 
eastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979), in which the Court construed the affirmative 
action language somewhat narrowly. See id at 413 (statute requires only that institutions not exclude 
on basis of handicap, not that they make major adjustments to accommodate handicapped). Appar-
ently, however, the Court's reading of the statute would require more of grantees than the Constitution 
would require under a rational basis test. 
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In title VI, therefore, as in many other titles of the 1964 Act,26S Congress 
drew upon the inspiration provided by the Constitution and Brown v . .Board of 
Education. Rather than apply the principle blindly in new areas, however, it 
fashioned practical new legislative contours to the antidiscrimination 
consensus. 
Finally, constitutional law is, of course, judicial law, and even clearer than 
Congress' appreciation that title VI could vary from constitutional law is its 
intent that the title vary from law as made by judges. Congress chose not to 
make the principles of section 601 subject to judicial interpretation and en-
forcement, but rather decided that "what [grantees] can and cannot do"269 
would be defined in regulations drafted by agencies and executive depart-
ments. Moreover, Congress rendered these agencies and departments respon-
sible both to the President, who would review the regulations, and to Congress, 
which could negate their regulations through legislation. The only role as-
signed to courts was to provide judicial review under the standards applicable 
to any ordinary agency action. This limited judicial role negates any idea that 
Congress intended to adopt the judiciary's constitutional standards as the 
touchstone for title VI.21o 
III. TOWARD A TRADITIONAL REGULATORY MODEL OF TITLE VI 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The preceding discussion refutes two predominant views of title VI. The 
first, argued by several white-dominated civil rights groups in 1964, is that by 
enacting title VI Congress was only performing its constitutional duty.271 This 
view, however, was never fashionable in the courts, and the legislative history 
suggests that it does not accurately reflect congressional intent. The second 
view, recently adopted by several justices of the Supreme Court, is that Con-
gress, in choosing from a range of possible definitions, adopted verbatim for 
title VI the Court's constitutional standards of discrimination.272 .Legislative 
history indicates that this view is also incorrect and ahistorical. This article 
has argued instead that Congress chose to avoid defining discrimination by 
vesting in agencies that power and responsibility. 
Although the standards set forth by title VI may differ in scope from the 
judiciary's equal protection rules, the problem of judicial-administrative inter-
268. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-c (1976) (title II provisions on public accommodations); 42 U.S.C. § 2000-
e (1976) (title VII provisions on employment discrimination). _ 
269. House Comm. Hearings, Sllpra note 51, at 2740 (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy). 
270. Although other governmental organs than courts have a duty to consider constitutional issues in 
making their decisions, see Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 
27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975), we have come to think of the federal courts as final arbiters or ultimate 
intepreters of the Constitution. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-04 (1974) (Court has 
authority to determine Constitution grants privilege to executive); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 
548-49 (1969) (determination of Constitutional right to sit in Congress within traditional role of courts). 
At the very least, therefore, it would seem curious for Congress to adopt judicially declared constitu-
tional rules as standards for agency decisions, and then relegate judicial review to the stand-by position 
it occupies in reviewing ordinary statutory cases. C.f. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545 & n.8 (1965) 
(Supreme Court will examine for itself facts that implicate application of constitutional law); Fiske v. 
Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 385 (1927) (same). 
271. See note 46 st~pra (discussing split among different civil rights groups). 
272. See note 12 Sllpra and accompanying text. 
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play remains because courts may be asked to review an agency's application of 
its regulations273 or to hear private suits invoking the provisions of title VJ,274 
This problem is especially complex because agencies, particularly HEW, have 
adopted two kinds of rules: formal regulations and interpretive guidelines.275 
Only the former have received presidential approval,276 
B. COURTS AND REGULATIONS 
I. Judicial Standard of Review 
Although this article has concluded that Congress adopted a traditional reg-
ulatory model for title VI, the inquiry into its application is not complete. A 
review of the passage of title VI helps to determine what kind. of agency 
rulemaking power the statute confers and whether an agency has exercised it 
properly. The full Supreme Court has not confronted these issues,277 but a 
concurring group of three justices addressed the problem in Lau v. Nichols and 
273. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-2 (1976) (subjecting department or agency action under title VI to judi-
cial review). 
274. C.f. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (implying private right of action 
under title IX because title patterned after title VI); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (allowing 
class action by students against school district under title VI). 
275. HEW developed a multi-tiered system of "regulations" and "guidelines," as well as "policy 
interpretations," "procedural announcements," and "decision announcements" (agency case digests). 
See 43 Fed. Reg. 18,630 (1978) (promulgating policy determinations); note 327 i'!fra (citing policy 
digests). HEW enforced as law memoranda and task force reports construing the regulations. See U.S. 
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS AND 
LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENTS: IDENTIFICATION OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE ASSIGN· 
MENT OF CHILDREN TO SPECIAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS (August 1975) (listing examples of possible 
violations of titles VI and VII) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Journal); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, 
EDUC. & WELFARE, TASK FORCE FINDINGS SPECIFYING REMEDIES AVAILABLE FOR ELIMINATING 
PAST EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES RULED UNLAWFUL UNDER Lou V. Nichols (Summer 1975) (discussing 
specific procedures in remedial bilingual education programs) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Jour· 
nat). The Task Force Findings, in particular, reveal tlie flexibility oftlie lawmaking process. Although 
this document purports only to propose remedies for prior violations, tlie agency uses the requirements 
in determining whetlier violations exist. The agency also considers any program not meeting the stan-
dards required of formerly discriminating programs to be guilty of discrimination. Statement to author 
by Ellen Myasato, Office for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, May 10, 1981 
(formerly Special Assistant to Director of Office for Civil Rights, HEW). 
276. See U.S. Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, Title IX oftlie Education Amendments of 1972; A 
Policy Interpretation; Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979) (signed by Di-
rector of Office for Civil Rights and Secretary of HEW); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, Eouc. & WELFARE, 
GUIDELINES FOR ELIMINATING DISCRIMINATION AND DENIAL OF SERVICES ON THE BASIS OF RACE, 
COLOR, NATIONAL ORIGIN, SEX, AND HANDICAP IN VOCATIONAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, 45 C.F.R. 
§ 80 app. B (1980) (published in 44 Fed. Reg. 17,164-68 (1979)) (signed by Director of Office for Civil 
Rights). These materials sometimes appear in tlie Federal Register, obviating the problem of public 
notice, but sometimes such interpretive materials are not published. Should a guideline be approved by 
a president, and meet tlie procedural and publication requirements generally applicable to regulations, 
tliat guideline would fall witliin tlie analytical definition of regulation for purposes of tlie discussion 
following in text. 
277. In Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), tlie majority upheld tlie constitutionality of title VI as 
supplemented by regulations and guidelines, id at 568-69, but did not specifically address the narrower 
issue whetlier tlie regulations were consistent with tlie statute. Similarly, in Regents oftlie University of 
California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), no majority spoke on the validity of the applicable regula· 
tions. Justice Powell did not discuss the issue at all./d at 269-324 (opinion of Powell, J.). The Brennan 
coalition noted only tliat one regulation was consistent witli tlie emphasis of title VI on voluntary 
remedial action. ld at 345 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ.). The remaining 
justices found tlie HEW regulations irrelevant to tlie case./d at 418 n.22 (opinion of Stevens, J., with 
Burger, C.J., Stewart & Rehnquist, JJ.). 
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upheld HEW's standards.278 Justice Stewart first quoted the principle that reg-
ulations are acceptable so long as they are "reasonably related to the purposes 
of the enabling legislation."279 He then added, however, that the regulations 
represent a "consistent administrative construction" of remedial legislation, 
and thus are entitled to great weight in interpreting the antidiscrimination lan-
guage of section 601.280 The Lau concurrence in effect adopted as a second 
consideration the administrative law test used under title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act,2Bl which assigns weight to consistent agency interpretations of 
vague statutory language.2s2 
An examination of the legislative history of title VI, however, shows that 
Justice Stewart should have omitted the second consideration. "Discrimina-
tion" in section 601 is no vague term to be defined once authoritatively and 
frozen into law; rather, it is a broad term that Congress deliberately chose to 
provide a basis for an evolving agency policy expressed through administrative 
rulemaking authority. HEW Secretary Celebrezze informed those conducting 
the hearings on title VI that he intended to adopt expansive definitions of dis-
crimination to root out underlying social problems.283 The committee re-
sponded not by curbing agencies altogether, but by requiring them to adopt 
regulations in advance so that grantees would "know what they can and can-
not do."284 The analogy to title VII, in which Congress refused to give such 
power to the affected agency, is therefore inapposite.285 
Justice Stewart's alternative test, requiring a reasonable relation tQ legisla-
tive purposes, is a workable approach only with the proviso that the legislative 
purpose of title VI was to permit an evolving definition of discrimination.286 A 
simpler and preferable solution is to recognize that when Congress delegated 
broad power to agencies to define discrimination it was following the guide of 
earlier legisl.ation directing agencies to act "in the public interest"287 or to con-
278. 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J., concurring in result). 
279. Id. 
280. I d. (quoting Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972)). The Brennan 
coalition in Bakke took the same approach. 438 U.S. at 342 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall & 
Blackmun, JJ.) (citingLau). Its reasoning, however, appears inconsistent: title VI cannot be both coex-
tensive with the Constitution, in the court's view, and yet also be free for interpretation by agencies. 
281. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976). 
282. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-45 (1976) (declining to give weight to EEOC 
guideline contradicting earlier agency position and conflicting with other indicia of proper interpreta-
tion of title VII). The degree of weight that courts accord an agency's construction of legislation has 
been a controversial issue since at least 1941. See Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 411 (1941) (judicial 
review of agency interpretation of statutory term ends if construction 'just and reasonable"); 1 K. 
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 30.10 (1958) (discussing Gray); B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW§§ 232-37 (1976) (same). The standard of "great deference" apparently supplies modem 
courts with the flexibility necessary to apply the Gray doctrine under title VII. Because, as stated below, 
title VI expressly authorizes agencies to define "discrimination" rather than merely to construe the 
statute, the issue in Gray should not arise in title VI cases. 
283. See notes 180-82 supra and accompanying text (discussing Celebrezze testimony). 
284. See note 209 supra and accompanying text (quoting Attorney General Kennedy at House sub-
committee hearings). 
285. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 & n.20 (1976) (EEOC may issue procedural 
regulations, but non-procedural rules merit less weight); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(a) (1976) (EEOC may 
issue regulation to govern intra-agency affairs; no general rulemaking authority). 
286. If this proviso were not adopted, the Gray problem discussed in note 282 supra would be raised. 
287. See Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1976) (requiring finding on record that licensed 
facilities be in public interest) (transferred to Department of Energy, 16 U.S.C. § 797 (Supp. III 1979)); 
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trol "unreasonable" practices.288 Such a delegation is not unconstitutionally 
vague, 289 and any other unfairness was addressed by Congress in provisions 
requiring presidential approval of regulations, advance publication, and con-
gressional review of agency action before imposition of final sanctions. Thus 
read, title VI created an evolutionary model, whereby an agency can change its 
definition of discrimination to meet the needs of the time. 
2. Consequences of the Open-Ended Standard of Review 
The phrases "open-ended" and "evolving" may be misleading because they 
connote the liberal direction which such words have taken in contemporary 
constitutionallaw.290 But title VI is ordinary legislation,291 and any changing 
administrative standards may be either more or less protective than constitu-
tional rules of the day. One administration may study a topic and decide that 
"effects" discrimination poses a serious problem; a different administration 
may reach a contrary solution in light of new evidence, changed circumstances, 
or even changed appreciations ofwrongs.292 Justice Stewart's approach in Lau 
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307 (1976) (authorizing agency to act for "public con-
venience, interest or necessity"). See also Udall v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 450 (1967) 
(interpreting Federal Power Act); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) 
(interpreting Communications Act of 1934). 
288. See Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1074 (Supp. III 1979) (prohibiting "unreasonable 
discrimination" by common carriers); Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, § 2(a), 
56 Stat. 23 (1942) (agency control of unreasonable prices must be "fair and equitable"). See also Amer-
ican Trucking Ass'n v. Atchison, T. & St. F. Ry., 387 U.S. 397, 411 (1967) (intrepreting Interstate 
Commerce Act); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423-24 (1944) (interpreting Emergency Price 
Control Act of 1942). 
289. Title VI does not impinge on individual liberties, which could invalidate a broad delegation. 
See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317-18 (1967) (dictum) (ordinance delegating to 
commission broad power to grant or withhold demonstration permits raises substantial constitutional 
issues and may be void if applied too broadly). Nor does it intrude on powers that the Constitution 
vests exclusively in Congress and prohibits it from delegating. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692-94 
(1892) (statute enabling President to levy tariffs on foreign commerce not unconstitutional because not 
delegation oflegislative power, but only of power to determine facts on which law depends); cf. Fahey 
v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245,250 (1947) (agency may not create new crimes); 1 K. DAVIS, Sllpra note 282, 
§ 204 (1958) (discussing penal regulations). Title VI does not extend regulatory authority over society 
as a whole, but only over those who have accepted "government largesse." q. National Cable TeleVJ· 
sion Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340-41 (1974) (agency may impose fee on party benefiting 
from agency regulation). An agency may reasonably expect a benefiting party to conform to its regula-
tions. q. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (f936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(Court will not pass on constitutionality of statute at instance of one who has availed himself of its 
benefits). 
Title VI does not establish any one agency to enforce the statute and to develop special expertise in 
antidiscrimination efforts. Instead, Congress has chosen to rely on the expertise of each agency in 
assessing the problems of discrimination within its subject-matter area. Perhaps most important, the 
range of agency discretion, as Congress understood it, is fairly narrow and intelligible: agencies can 
choose to focus on either intentional racial discrimination or on "effects" racial discrimination, or on 
both. These phrases provide a sufficient guide for agencies acting under title VI and its analogues. See 
generally 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 282, § 2.01 (discussing doctrine prohibiting delegation of power to 
agencies without adequate standards). 
290. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966) (Douglas, J.) ("Notions of what 
constitutes equal treatment do change") (citing Brown 1). 
291. Because Congress has exercised its spending power, rather than fourteenth amendment power, 
in enacting title VI, there is no occasion to discuss the "ratchet" conception that would invalidate any 
legislation which is less protective than constitutional standards. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 
249 n. 31 (1970); Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret /Jue Process and Equal Protection, 21 STAN. 
L. REv. 603, 606 (1975). 
292. q. text accompanying note 136 supra (demonstrating that Brennan coalition in Bakke recog· 
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would freeze all initial determinations;293 the evolutionary model does not. 
The evolutionary solution might introduce political elements into title VI. 
Congress foresaw that possibility, however, and attached primarily political 
safeguards to the regulatory authority. Replacement of an earlier regulation 
requires presidential approval,294 with all the political repercussions from 
Congress29S and the public at large which that entails.296 That the political 
branches might acquiesce in such a change was the price Congress chose to 
pay when it decided to allow administrative movement in title VI rather than 
tying it to judicially fixed-or judicially varying-doctrine. 
C. COURTS AND GUIDELINES-AND OTHER INFORMAL DECISIONS 
I. Standard of Review 
Section 602 authorizes agencies to issue "rules, regulations, and orders of 
general applicability."297 Soon after enactment of title VI and the passage of 
the first regulations under it, federal agencies began to issue "guidelines" and 
other interpretive memoranda, elaborating on the regulations.298 The argu-
ment that this practice illegally subverts the presidential approval require-
ment299 appears untenable. First, in the Stennis Amendment, Congress 
recognized and condoned the practice. 300 In addition, legislative history 
reveals that Congress, in the Lindsay Amendment, did not intend to require 
presidential approval of all agency standards or decisions, but only ·those of 
"general applicability."301 Moreover, if an agency can interstitially interpret a 
presidentially approved regulation in the process of case-by-case administra-
tive adjudication, it should have the power to declare by advance notice its 
nized importance of "experience" and "administrative necessity"). In addition, the agency may con-
sider, but is not bound by, "evolving judicial doctrine." 438 U.S. at 337. 
293. See 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., with Burger, C.J. & B1ackmun, J., concurring) (to be valid, 
regulations must conform to purpose of act). 
294. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l (1976). The authority of an agency merely to rescind a regulation without 
authority is unclear. C.f. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., with Burger, 
CJ., Stewart & Stevens, JJ., concurring) (unreviewable political question whether President may aoro-
gate treaty ratified by Senate); Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en bane) 
(agency may not refuse to enforce title VI). The purpose of Congress' demand for presidential ap-
proval, see note 217 supra, also rules out delegation of authority to less politically visible officers. See 
United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 512-25 (1974) (warrant approval power non-delegable). 
295. See notes 230-53 supra and accompanying text (noting previous responses to enforcement 
changes). 
296. See Bickel, "Realistic, Sensible,,, (II}, NEw REPUBLIC, April 4 & 11, 1970 (reflecting EOlitical 
commentators' reaction to President Nixon's stand on school desegregation); Osborne, Paying for Inte-
gration, NEW REPUBLIC, June 6, 1970, at 10 (same); Osborne, School Statement (I}, NEw REPUBLIC, 
April 4 & 11, 1970, at 13 (same). 
297. 42 u.s.c. § 2000d-l (1976). 
298. Dunn, supra note 68, at 44; cf. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974) (illustrating supplemen-
tary detail provided by bilingual education guidelines). For a sample of these interpretive materials, 
see notes 275-76 supra. 
299. See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Matthews, 562 F.2d 914, 926 (4th Cir. 1977) (en 
bane) (Widener, J., dissentmg in part) (HEW guidelines undermining national standard possible only 
with presidential approval), vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 571 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 
1978) (en bane). 
300. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-6(c) (1976) (section should not be construed to diminish duty to comply 
with title VI guidelines); note 240 supra and accompanying text (discussing passage of Stennis 
Amendment). 
301. 110 CoNG. REc. 2499-500 (1963) (remarks of Rep. Lindsay replying to Rep. Poll). 
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plans for interpretation and application of the regulation.302 That is what the 
guidelines and informal opinions purport to do. 
Nevertheless, guidelines should not receive the same deference that courts 
accord to regulations. Absence of presidential approval of guidelines does not 
invalidate them, but it does leave them without the strong political controls 
attending promulgation of regulations. More importantly, the legislative his-
tory discloses that Congress provided the safeguard of judicial review303 spe-
cifically to ensure that agency action conform to the regulations.304 The 
guidelines, therefore, should conform to the standard that Justice Stewart ap-
peared to demand of regulations inLau.305 Guidelines deserve weight in inter-
preting ambiguous regulations, but they may not serve, as do regulations, to 
start the process of substantively defining discrimination.306 To allow other-
wise would defeat the political controls attending promulgation of 
regulations. 307 
2. Consequences of the Standard of Review 
Although guidelines should not serve as substitutes for regulations, it is 
sometimes difficult to determine whether a guideline is independently intro-
ducing new considerations, or is merely elaborating on considerations already 
present in the underlying regulation. In the context of title VI, however, it is 
apparent that if a guideline established either an intent or effects test for the 
first time, it would be invalid as a substitute for regulation. 
Congress was well aware that the administration might use its title VI au-
302. The Lindsay-Poff colloquy, id, indicates that Congress understood that the general regulations 
would need to be applied to particular situations. Such specific application would involve by itself a 
measure of interpretive authority. See generally 1 K. DAVIS, supra note 282, § 30.11 (application of 
rules in particularized circumstances). 
303. 42 u.s.c. § 2000d-2 (1976). 
304. See House Comm. Hearings_ supra note 51, at 2765-66 (remarks of Rep. Mathias in colloquy 
with Attorney General Kennedy) (expressing concern with breadth of regulation-making authority). 
305. 414 U.S. at 571; see Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Matthews, 562 F.2d 914, 922 n.6 
(4th Cir. 1978) (en bane) (requiring strict agency compliance with own regulations for protection of 
parties), vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 511 F.2d 1273 (en bane); cj: Morton v. 
Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235 (1974) (agencies must follow own regulations affecting individual rights); Serv-
ice v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957) (Secretary of State must act in accordance with own department 
regulations). This may have been the focus of Justice Stewart's concurrence in Lau, a focus blurred by 
the Justice's collapsing of the tiers of regulation and guidelines. See 414 U.S. at 571 (Stewart, J., with 
Burger, C.J. & Blackmun, J., concurring) (applying HEW guidelines to standard of validity for 
regulations). 
306. The same problem arises in an administrative proceeding when the presiding agency officer 
must apply a regulation without benefit of published guidelines or other interpretive memoranda. An 
administrative law judge has no authority, as would the agency at the regulation-making stage, to range 
widely in defining "discrimination." See OFFICE OF STANDARDS, POLICY, AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T 
OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT CASE-RELATED MEMORANDA (1979) (dis-
cussing application of agency regulations to particular situations) (copy on file at Georgetown Law Jour-
nal). See also note 294 supra (no delegation permitted). 
307. Once guidelines or other policy determinations reveal an agency's specific interpretation and 
enforcement rules, the only remaming problem is how a court should review an agency's findings of 
fact. Following common administrative law principles, see Steadman v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n, 
101 S. Ct. 999, 1004-05, 1008 (1981) (in absence of explicit procedural standards for agency proceed-
ings, courts have discretion to define standard, considering intent of agency and agency practice), the 
standard of review here should be the "substantial evidence" test. See note 206 supra {legislative his-
tory specifies this standard). 
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thority to control "racial imbalance."308 That possibility prompted the spon-
sors to assure Congress that the executive would exercise its power in 
compliance with the Administrative Procedure Act, and to accept the Lindsay 
Amendment requiring presidential approval of proposed regulations. These 
congressional safeguards can be effective only if the agency makes the crucial 
choice of which test to use at the regulation stage rather than in the guide-
lines.309 Once the agency has adopted a regulatory test for discrimination, the 
degree of latitude the agency may exercise at the guidelines stage will depend 
upon which test the agency has chosen. 
Intent-Focused Regulations. If the regulations adopt the intentional dis-
crimination standard, one might expect fact-finding ·to be the agencies' only 
remaining concem.310 The mere existence of an intent standard does not indi-
cate, however, what procedures may be used to divine intent. For example, 
although the Court has at times held that under an intent test the burden is on 
the plaintiff to prove that the alleged discrimination was intentional,311 it has 
failed to apply this approach uniformly in both constitutionaP 12 and statute-
based cases.313 Indeed, any procedures designed to enforce the intent test 
would be permissible under the standard of review for guidelines.314 Accord-
ingly, an agency might specify by guideline that a complainant could use dis-
parate effects to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination, 
placing the burden of rebutting on the grantee.315 
Under intent-standard regulations, however, the agency could not go further 
and adopt through guidelines the per se test of impact discrimination. This 
test uses statistical disparities not as an evidentiary aid to divining intent, but 
as a substantive definition of the legal wrong.316 Popularized by Professor 
308. See notes 173-79 supra and accompanying text (discussing possibility that title VI could pro-
hibit racial imbalance). 
309. If the President should approve a "guideline" and have it published, this decision could be 
made at the guidelines stage. It is not the label that is important, of course, but what has occurred at 
the rulemaking stage. C.f. note 276 supra (same problem). 
310. See note 307 supra. 
311. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977) 
(burden on complainant to prove that discriminatory intent motivating factor in challenged action). 
312. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482,495-96 (1977) (allowing plaintiff to establish prima facie 
case of intentional discrimination in grand jury selection using statistics; shifting burden to state to 
rebut presumption). 
313. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093-95 (1981) (after 
title VII plaintiff makes prima facie case, defendant bears burden of showing possible nondiscrimina-
tory reasons for actions); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 339 
(1977) (plaintiff in title VII action bears initial burden of establishing prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, shifting to defendant burden of rebutting inference); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 (1973) (same). 
314. See Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372-74 (1973) (remedial admin-
istrative rule acceptable if it "implements the objectives of the Act"). 
315. See Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1093-94 (1981) (similar 
procedural rules for proving intent, when intent is relevant in title VII cases). 
316. The Supreme Court, in Board of Education v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979), recognized the dis-
tinction between an evidentiary effects test and a per se effects test. I d at 143-44. It's subsequent 
remark that the prima facie case proved under the evidentiary related test could be rebutted by proof of 
educational necessity, however, showed some confusion concerning exactly what evidence is adduced 
under that test. See id at 151. 
As popularized by Professor Ely, see Ely, supra note 172, at 1292, and as used in one class of title VII 
cases, see Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981) (disparate treatment· 
46 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1 
Brest in 1970,317 and apparently read into title VII in Griggs v . .Duke Power 
Company,3 18 this test is so unconcerned with intent that even non-racial be-
nign intentions are considered irrelevant.31 9 Under the test, racial imbalance 
constitutes discrimination per se.320 Employment of such a test at the guide-
lines stage, if the regulations had adopted an intent test, would be unreasona-
ble and ultra vires321 because it would contradict the intent-focused definition 
adopred at the presidentially approved level of rulemaking. 
Effects-Focused Regulations. In simplest terms, the problems here are 
identical to those discussed above. If the regulations adopted an effects stan-
dard for discrimination, it would appear that agency guidelines using an intent 
test would be invalid. As noted under the previous subsection, however, the 
overlap between intent tests and effects tests permits a role for effects anlysis 
under an intent-focused regulation.322 Can the same be said for an intent-fo-
cused guideline under an effects-type regulation? 
Essentially the problems is this: if an agency adopts an effects analysis 
through proper regulations, the question remains whether it has adopted the 
evidentiary effects test or the per se effects test. 323 The very phrasing of the 
semantic problem suggests that the agency should have the power to construe 
its effects test at the guidelines stage to eliminate any ambiguity, and reviewing 
courts should accord great deference to that construction. 
Equally relevant at this stage, however, is the earlier conclusion that al-
though agencies have wide authority to define, and everi periodically to change 
their definition of, discrimination by regulation, they have no such power 
case), the evidentiary effects test searches ultimately for evidence of intent. The Court in Harris, 
though, analogizing to the separate Griggs line of title VII cases, see note 318 i'!fra, appeared to under-
stand the test as requiring a court to balance any compelling justifications for discnminatory action 
against any unintended harm actually caused. 444 U.S. at 141. 
This discussion follows the traditional approach and combines the rebuttable effects test with the per 
se, or irrebuttable, effects test because both tests determine the existence of discrimination through the 
use of statistics demonstrating that an action has a discriminatory effect. The former incorporates a 
balancing of competing interests-permitting some interests to outweigh discriminatory effects-while 
the latter does not. An evidentiary effects test, on the other hand, uses discriminatory effects only as a 
mechanism for proving discriminatory intent. For purposes of title VI, both the Harris version of the 
evidentiary effects test and the per se test define discrimination by reference to effects; the traditional 
evidentiary effects test, on the other hand, defines discrimination ultimately by reference to intent. 
317. See Brest, supra note 172, at llO {impact alone may trigger demand for justification of actions), 
318. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) (employment prerequisite not job 
related and having discriminatory impact prohibited under title VII). 
319. Id. at 432. 
320. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1968) 
(unintentional discriminatory impact of urban renewal program violates equal protection clause). such 
discrimination may occasionally be justified, but the court's focus is always on impact as such, not on 
good intentions. See Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286, 1288 (5th Cir. 1971), ajfd en bane per 
curiam, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972) (compelling state interest may justify state-caused discriminatory 
effect). 
321. One might argue that the per se effects test is permissible here as a mere procedural device 
establishing a conclusive presumption of intentional discrimination, thus tying the effects test to the 
implementation of intent-standard regulations. Making the presumption conclusive, however, changes 
the ultimate focus of the regulation from intent to impact; that choice must be made by the president at 
the regulationmaking stage. See note 309 supra and accompanying text. 
322. See text accompanying note 315 supra (use of effects to establish prima facie case of intentional 
discrimination appropriate). 
323. See note 316 supra (former uses effects as evidence of intent; latter defines discrimination in 
terms of effects). 
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when making guidelines. Accordingly, as Justice Stewart observed, the guide-
lines may only construe the rule of law already announced, not make new 
law,324 and as Justice Rehnquist concluded in a related context, agencies may 
use their power of authoritative construction only once.325 
These conclusions are important because HEW and its successor depart-
ments326 have construed their wide-ranging regulations to focus on effects per 
·Se rather than on effects as evidence ofintent.327 The Court has similarly un-
derstood the guidelines as so interpreting the regulations.328 Thus, any effort to 
substitute an intent test could be accomplished only by promulgating new pre-
sidentially approved regulations. 
Silent Regulations. If the regulation is silent on ·the choice of an intent 
or impact definition for discrimination, 329 what authority can the agency exer-
cise in adopting a test at the guidelines stage? Because no presidentially ap-
proved decision was made by regulation, one conclusion would be that none 
should be made by guidelines not subject to presidential approval. A prefera-
ble approach, however, would be to conclude that because such a regulation 
proscribes at least some discrimination, and absent a presidential showing of 
courage, courts should deem the regulati~ns to permit only the less intrusive 
test of discrimination. Although debate is possible as to which test is less intru-
324. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 571 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (guidelines entitled to 
great weight because department has "reasonably and consistently" interpreted§ 601). 
325. See General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1976) (new title VII guideline, inconsis-
tent with previous agency position, entitled to little weight in construing act). 
326. The current regulations of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) continue to 
use an effects-oriented definition of discrimination. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1980) (grantees may not 
"utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the ejfrct of subjecting individuals to discrim-
ination") (emphasis added); id. § 80.3(b )(3) (grantee may not "make selections with the ejfrct" of sub-
jecting individuals to discrimination) (emphasis added). The same is true of the regulations of the 
Department of Education. See 45 Fed. Reg. 30,802, 30,918-19 (1980) (to be codified in 34 C.F.R. 
§§ ]00.3(b)(2), .3(b)(3) (1981)) (same language as HHS regulations); cf. 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.3(b)(2), .3(b)(3) 
(1979) (original HEW regulations containing same language). 
327. See I OFFICE OF STANDARDS, POLICY AND RESEARCH, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T 
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT CASE-RELATED MEMORANDA 9-13 (Decem-
ber 1981) (closure of hospitals violates title VI if it has "disproportionate adverse [racial] effect" on 
program beneficiaries unless "necessary" to further program objective and there is no alternative with 
lesser disproportionate impact); OFFICE OF STANDARDS, POLICY AND RESEARCH, OFFICE FOR CIVIL 
RIGHTS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT CASE-RELATED MEMO-
RANDA 10-11 (April & May 1979) (admissions tests having "disproportionate impact on minority candi-
dates" unacceptable unless validated). 
328. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1971) (under bilingual education guidelines discrimina-
tory effect per se discrimination; affirmative duty arises to eliminate adverse effect). 
A recognition that Lau interpreted the guidelines to establish a per se effects test eliminates some of 
the confusion regarding how to apply the effects test. In NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 
2032 (3d Cir. June 29, 1981) (en bane), the Third Circuit considered the two different effects theories 
that can apply to title VII cases in an effort to determine the test for title VI. I d. at 2033. The eviden-
tiary effects test employed in some title VII cases is inapposite to a title VI claim because it focuses on 
intent. See Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978) (burden on plaintiff to prove prima 
facie case of intentional discrimination; burden shifts to defendant to justify actions). The per se effects 
test used in other title VII cases, however, is relevant because it relies primarily on effects. See Interna-
tional Bhd. ofTeamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335 n.l5 (1977) (dictum) (acknowledging alter-
native title VII theory in which proof of discriminatory motive unnecessary). 
329. Justice Department guidelines have established uniform model standards for regulations under 
title VI. Dunn, supra note 68, at 55. All current regulations appear to adopt an effects test. See note 2 
supra (listing regulations). There may be no current regulations, therefore, that are silent on choice of 
intent or impact. 
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sive,330 the legislative history suggests that in 1964 Congress thought the intent 
test was less intrusive than the effects test and that adoption of an effects test 
would demand a stronger display of presidential will.331 Consequently, agen-
cies whose regulations are silent should have no more authority at the guide-
lines stage than those whose regulations adopt an intent test for 
discrimination. 332 
IV. CoNcLUSION 
This investigation of the history of title VI demonstrates the fundamental 
misconception of previous arguments as to whether the statute adopts the con-
stitutional "intent" standard or a more probing "effects" test for defining dis-
crimination. Although the path to understanding here is as convoluted as the 
plot of an Agatha Christie thriller, the evidence suggests that title VI repre-
sented a carefully crafted compromise in the House. An essential linchpin of 
that compromise was the decision to grant executive departments and agencies 
wide latitude in defining "discrimination." Although later Senate debates con-
tained constitutional rhetoric, the Senate acted, and understood itself to be 
acting, on no fresh initiatives and only confirmed the House compromise. In-
deed, the very political considerations written into the text of title VI negate 
the idea that the Eighty-Eighth Congress saw the statute as resolutely cotermi-
nous with constitutional doctrine. No later Congress has overturned that judg-
ment, and subsequent legislation modeled on title VI and protecting women, 
handicapped persons, and aged persons, suggests that recent Congresses have 
understood the statutory language to authorize agency action against forms of 
discrimination not proscribed by the Constitution. 
Title VI specifies no definition of "discrimination"; rather, it authorizes de-
partments and agencies to adopt definitions appropriate for their respective 
programs. This notion of wide administrative discretion may be unfashion-
able today,333 but it was not so regarded by Congress in 1964. In those less 
cynical days "administrative expertise" was more than a myth and trust in 
bureaucrats more than a naive and defeated political program.334 Even the 
statute's principal check on bureaucratic excess, presidential approval of regu-
330. Some might believe that the intent test is very intrusive, because it examines normally sacro-
sanct mental processes and personal thoughts. Cf. Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 984, 995 (2d Cir. 
1977) (discovery seeking to establish journalist's motive in libel case impermissible inquiry into 
thoughts and opinions), rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(2) (mental processes of coun-
sel privileged). The effects test, on the other hand, measures objectively verifiable phenomena. The 
intent test maY. not be substantially more intrusive than the effects test if effects are used as evidence of 
intent. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,267-68 (1977) 
(allowing use of objective evidence of effect to prove intent). 
331. See text accompanying notes 177-91 supra (criticism ofCelebreeze testimony concerning racial 
imbalance). 
332. See text accompanying note 315 supra (discussing guideline authority of agencies under intent 
regulations). The same conclusions would also apply to title IX regulations and guidelines because 
those regulations are also subject to presidential approval. See note 257 supra (quoting text of title IX). 
333. See Neustadt, The Administration's Regulatory Reform Program: An Overview, 32 AD. L. REV. 
129, 131 (1980) (explaining erosion of public support for government regulation); Proceedings of lite 
National Co'!ference on Federal Regulation/ Roads to Reform, Panel IV: Improving the Administrative 
Process-Time fora NewAPA, 32 AD. L. REv. 287,294 (1980) (Judge Leventhal stating that populist 
mood against technical bureaucrats). 
334. See House Subcomm. Hearings, supra note 43, at 1890 (remarks of Chairman Celler) ("title VI 
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lations defining discrimination, reflected congressional reliance primarily on 
political rather than judicial safeguards. 
This new investigation into the origins of title VI suggests that solving the 
problem of how courts should deal with the statute requires a fundamental 
recasting of the problem. Because Congress adopted a regulatory model for 
title VI, administrative, rather than constitutional, law provides the framework 
for analysis. Thus, courts should accord agencies wide definitional power in 
formulating regulations approved by the President. They should recognize no 
such power, however, when agencies initially seek to define discrimination by 
unapproved guidelines or other informal rulemaking. Judicial willingness to 
enforce the abuse-control mechanism chosen by Congress-presidential ap-
proval of regulations-would render unnecessary the oourts' attempts to bring 
agencies to heel by requiring them to echo the court-declared terms of the 
Constitution. 
offers wide discretion . . . . Those who want to give that kind of discretion will vote for title VI"); id at 
2164 (remarks of Rep. Rodino) ("administrators have ... done a superior job"). 
